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THE RUNAWAY PRESIDENTIAL POWER OVER DIPLOMACY
Jean Galbraith*
The President claims exclusive control over diplomacy within our
constitutional system. Relying on this claim, executive branch lawyers
repeatedly reject congressional mandates regarding international
engagement. In their view, Congress cannot specify what the policy of
the United States is with respect to foreign corruption, cannot bar a
technology-focused agency from communicating with China, cannot
impose notice requirements for withdrawal from a treaty with Russia,
cannot instruct Treasury officials how to vote in the World Bank, and
cannot require the disclosure of a trade-related report. These are just
a few of many examples from recent years. The President’s assertedly
exclusive powers over diplomacy have become a powerful yet rarely
critiqued tool for withholding information from Congress and for
rebuffing congressional supervision over the content and agents of
international engagement.
This Article interrogates the constitutional concept of “diplomacy”—a
word that, for all the emphasis the executive branch now puts upon it,
was barely an English word at the time of the Framing and was not
used during the Constitution’s drafting and ratification. Both structural
reasoning and historical practice suggest that exclusive presidential
powers over diplomacy should have a narrower ambit than executive
branch lawyers currently claim. The Article excavates several forgotten
limits on these powers. One is the distinction between policy and
negotiation. The executive branch asserts exclusive power over both,
but Congress has strong counterclaims to a constitutional power to
establish policy objectives and to control outputs, such as votes in
* Professor, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. For comments at various stages,
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International Law in Domestic Court annual conference, the University of Minnesota Law
School Public Law Workshop, and the Penn Law faculty workshop. For terrific research
support, I thank law librarian Gabriela Femenia and research assistants Jamie Nash, David
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Virginia Law Review, especially Michael Patton and Caleb Theriot, for all their work editing
this Article.
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international organizations. Another limit relates to domestic-facing
administrative agencies, which increasingly engage in regulatory
coordination abroad. Both Congress’s traditional role in supervising
agencies and the substance of these agencies’ work suggest that their
international engagement should not necessarily partake of whatever
exclusive powers the President holds over diplomacy and instead
should be more subject to congressional control. The Article closes by
proposing a distribution of power over international engagement that
provides more control to Congress and by identifying institutional
strategies that Congress could deploy to achieve this distribution.
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INTRODUCTION
A core assumption of the executive branch is that the President
possesses exclusive constitutional powers with respect to diplomacy. The
White House and the Department of Justice routinely invoke these
asserted powers to rebuff congressional interventions in foreign affairs.
In 2020, for example, the Trump administration declared that Congress
cannot specify that “[i]t is the policy of the United States” to help foreign
allies combat corruption; cannot require the executive branch to give it
notice prior from withdrawing from an important arms-monitoring treaty;
and cannot require the Secretary of Commerce to provide Congress with
a report on its use of statutorily delegated authority with respect to tariffs.1
For executive branch lawyers, the “President’s exclusive prerogatives in
conducting the Nation’s diplomatic relations are grounded in both the
Constitution’s system for the formulation of foreign policy, including the
presidential powers set forth in Article II of the Constitution, and in the
President’s acknowledged preeminent role in the realm of foreign
relations throughout the Nation’s history.”2
These sweeping claims fit poorly with our broader constitutional
framework. As Justice Jackson famously instructed, assertions of
exclusive presidential power “must be scrutinized with caution, for what
is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”3
Yet the exclusive diplomatic powers claimed by the President have gone
largely unexamined. With the exception of one recent decision focused
1

Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Eliot Engel,
Chairman of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., and Maxine Waters, Chairwoman of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs. Regarding H.R. 3843, at 1 (May 18, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1277331/download
[https://perma.cc/J7UP-9LEU];
Congressionally Mandated Notice Period for Withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty, 44
Op. O.L.C. __, slip op. at 10–12 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1348136/download
[https://perma.cc/5HEZ-3V9D] [hereinafter OLC Opinion of Sept. 22, 2020]; Publication of
a Report to the President on the Effect of Automobile and Automobile-Part Imports on the
National Security, 44 Op. O.L.C. __, slip op. at 1–2 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/
olc/opinion/file/1236426/download [https://perma.cc/PQ6K-DY3D] [hereinafter OLC
Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020].
2
Prohibition of Spending for Engagement of the Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y with China, 35
Op. O.L.C. 116, 120 (2011) [hereinafter OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011]; see also, e.g., Letter
from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. Regarding H.R. 4537, at 1 (Mar. 5, 2018)
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1041156/download [https://perma.cc/L3PW-4KYK]
[hereinafter DOJ Letter of Mar. 5, 2018] (quoting this language).
3
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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on the power to recognize foreign nations, the Supreme Court has not
confronted these issues.4 Among scholars as well, the diplomatic powers
occupy a distant back seat to two other major constitutional powers in the
field of foreign relations law: the war powers and the treaty powers.5
While countless articles explore these two domains, there is relatively
little scholarship on the diplomatic powers.6 This remains true even as the
executive branch has come over time, especially since the late 1980s, to
4
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 32 (2015) (holding that the President has the exclusive
constitutional power to recognize foreign nations but emphasizing the limited nature of this
holding); see also infra Subsection I.A.2 (discussing the implications of Zivotofsky for the
allocation of the diplomatic powers more generally).
5
The approach taken in the two major foreign relations law casebooks is illustrative of the
field’s neglect of the diplomatic powers. Both casebooks have voluminous chapters devoted
to the treaty powers and the war powers, but neither has even a sub-chapter focused on the
diplomatic powers. See Curtis A. Bradley, Ashley Deeks & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign
Relations Law: Cases and Materials, at xi–xviii (7th ed. 2020) (devoting more than 260 pages
to treaties, executive agreements, and war powers while not mentioning diplomacy in the table
of contents); Sean D. Murphy, Edward T. Swaine & Ingrid Wuerth, U.S. Foreign Relations
Law: Cases, Materials, and Practice Exercises, at xi–xix (5th ed. 2018) (devoting more than
330 pages to treaties, executive agreements, and war powers while not mentioning diplomacy
in the table of contents). Even where the concept of diplomacy is emphasized in general
treatises, as in Michael Glennon’s work, there is surprisingly little discussion of the
constitutional distribution of the diplomatic powers, as distinct from war powers and treaty
powers. See generally Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (1990). An exception in
substantial alignment with the executive branch positions described in this Article is H.
Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Essay in Constitutional
Interpretation 152–54 (2002) (giving detailed treatment to the President’s power over
recognition, negotiation, and diplomatic information in addition to considering other areas of
foreign relations law).
6
For a few excellent pieces focused on aspects of the diplomatic powers, see generally Ryan
M. Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, 68 Duke L.J. 907 (2019) [hereinafter Scoville, Ad Hoc
Diplomats] (discussing executive branch justifications for the use of non-Senate-confirmed
diplomats); Kristina Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107
Am. J. Int’l L. 517, 519–20 (2013) (describing the historic responsiveness of the Department
of the Treasury to congressional directives regarding U.S. participation in the World Bank);
Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 Temple L. Rev. 1
(2013) (analyzing historical practice with respect to executive branch claims of an exclusive
power to recognize foreign nations); Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 Mich. L.
Rev. 331 (2012) [hereinafter Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy] (assessing the extent to which
members of Congress engage in diplomatic activity). This Article draws on the insights of
these scholars in providing an overarching description of the diplomatic powers claimed by
the executive branch and showing that most of these claims rest on problematic constitutional
foundations. One interesting recent article that grapples briefly but significantly with the scope
of the exclusive diplomatic powers is Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation
of Powers, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 357 (2018). Price suggests that Congress should be able to control
the conduct of diplomacy through the appropriations power in certain resource-dependent
contexts. See id. at 449–61.
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invoke these assertedly exclusive powers more widely, stridently, and
meaningfully.
The first task of this Article, therefore, is to provide a comprehensive
account of exclusive diplomatic powers claimed by the President. Simply
put, the scope of these asserted powers is breathtaking. When executive
branch lawyers speak of exclusive power over “diplomacy,” they are
actually sweeping together a bundle of five discrete powers. These are:
the power to represent the United States abroad; the power to recognize
foreign nations; the power to determine the content of diplomatic
communications; the power to select the agents of diplomacy; and the
power to control access to diplomatic information. Each of these powers
has its own constitutional pedigree and implicates different institutional
values. The first two of these powers are well-established but narrow,
while the latter three are deeply contested and dangerously broad. The
exclusive power asserted over content, for example, is routinely claimed
to encompass total control over the “time, scope, and objectives” of
negotiations.7 And it reaches not just talk but also actions, such as the
casting of U.S. votes within international organizations. When Congress
issues mandates that run counter to these claims of exclusive executive
power, the executive branch simply needs to get a legal opinion from the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) to have its way.
Further underlying all claims of the “President’s exclusive power to
conduct diplomacy”8 is an exceptionally capacious conception of
“diplomacy.” Whether the subject is war or science, whether the forum is
an international organization or a bilateral meeting, whether the executive
branch officials involved are traditional diplomats or insurance
regulators—all is “diplomacy” to the executive branch and therefore not
subject to congressional control.9 As OLC has put it in finding that

7
Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, Ronald Reagan Presidential Libr. & Museum (Dec. 22, 1987),
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-signing-foreign-relationsauthorization-act-fiscal-years-1988-and-1989 [https://perma.cc/Y33S-2EGX] [hereinafter
Reagan 1987 Signing Statement]; see also, e.g., Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Ed Royce, Chairman of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs.
Regarding H.R. 5819, at 2 (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/
file/1159456/download [https://perma.cc/F2DL-8G3E] (using similar language).
8
OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 116.
9
E.g., DOJ Letter of Mar. 5, 2018, supra note 2, at 2 (asserting that exclusive presidential
powers over diplomacy rendered unconstitutional almost every section of a proposed
congressional bill regarding the participation of Department of Treasury officials at an
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Congress cannot prevent a technology-focused agency from negotiating
with Chinese counterparts, “We have described the President’s authority
over international negotiations as extending to any subject that has
bearing on the national interest.”10
This panoramic conception of “diplomacy” greatly expands the already
substantial executive branch powers claimed over diplomatic content,
agents, and information. Yet as this Article shows in its second overall
contribution, this conception is far from constitutionally foreordained.
Indeed, the word “diplomacy” itself was barely an English word at the
time of the Framing and does not appear to have been used at all during
the many debates surrounding the Constitution’s drafting and
ratification.11 Rather, at that time, there was at most a sense that the
President had certain constitutional prerogatives with respect to the
negotiation of treaties, which in turn would ultimately require the advice
and consent of the Senate. And as the United States came over time to
engage in many forms of international engagement other than treaties,
Congress left most management with the executive branch but
periodically claimed control over aspects of this engagement.
In particular, I identify four ways in which Congress has asserted
control in the past over aspects of U.S. international engagement in ways
that undermine the broad view of “diplomacy” adopted by today’s
executive branch lawyers. These four ways can be thought of as lost limits
on exclusive presidential power over diplomacy. These limits are in
addition to the very important power of Congress to control the
implementation (or non-implementation) of most U.S. commitments as a
matter of domestic policy—a power which the executive branch continues
to acknowledge as belonging to Congress.12 One limit was structural: to
view the President as having exclusive power over the process of
negotiation and the specific instructions given to negotiators, but to
consider Congress entitled if it wished to form foreign policy objectives
on the front end and to control acts with international legal significance
at the back end. A second limit was content-based: to define “diplomacy”
international standard-setting organization focused on the regulation of the insurance
industry).
10
OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 121–22 (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
11
See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
12
For a discussion of the power over implementation, see Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to
International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1675, 1707–10 (2017).
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as encompassing only issues involving certain subject matters or above
certain thresholds of importance. A third limit was institutional: to
exclude domestically focused agencies from the ambit of “diplomacy,”
such that Congress could exercise its usual level of control with respect
to their activities abroad and with respect to how they interfaced with
other executive branch actors regarding international engagement. A
fourth limit developed from the rise of international organizations, as
Congress initially claimed and exerted greater control as a price for
supporting U.S. entry and participation in these organizations.
This nuanced and complex history has no place in OLC’s current
approach to the diplomatic powers. Rather, by selectively invoking early
sources and reading them out of context, OLC gives the impression that
the exclusivity of the whole bundle of the President’s diplomatic powers
is longstanding, firmly settled, and plainly applicable to all forms of
modern foreign relations. The Trump administration took this perspective
to its logical extreme, repeatedly invoking diplomatic powers in letters
objecting to draft bills and in several important refusals to obey
congressional mandates.13 Yet while the Trump administration was
unusually truculent, its understanding of the diplomatic powers flowed
from OLC memoranda written during both Democratic and Republican
administrations of the prior few decades that overread sources, ignored
historical practice at odds with their positions, and failed to grapple with
the profound changes in U.S. international engagement from the time of
the Framing to the present.
Given the thin foundations of executive branch claims, congressional
power over international engagement is ripe for reinvigoration. The final
goal of this Article is to consider how such reinvigoration could be
accomplished. This is not an easy avenue of inquiry, and it does not lend
itself to any very satisfying solution. Doctrinally, I argue in favor of an
intermediate approach between the extreme positions staked out by the
13
See Jean Galbraith and Benjamin Schwartz, The Trump Administration and Executive
Power: Evidence from Justice Department Views Letters, Lawfare (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-and-executive-power-evidence-justicedepartment-views-letters [https://perma.cc/M2LK-TAB4] (noting that in the first two years of
the Trump administration, the Department of Justice sent fifteen letters to Congress raising
objections to draft legislation as intruding on the president’s diplomatic powers); OLC
Opinion of Sept. 22, 2020, supra note 1, at 2 (invoking the diplomatic powers as a basis for
refusing to obey a congressional mandate with respect to treaty withdrawal); OLC Opinion of
Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 1–2 (invoking the diplomatic powers as a basis for refusing to
obey a congressional reporting requirement).
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executive branch and an alternative of complete congressional
supremacy. There are a number of possible ways to accomplish this, and
I offer some suggestions in the spirit of opening bids. Specifically, I
suggest using two of the lost limits on “diplomacy” to achieve a more
tempered balance—limits that draw on historical practice, respond to
functional changes in U.S. foreign relations since the Framing, and
emphasize the core structural concept of checks and balances. The first is
to acknowledge congressional power to set policy objectives at the front
end and to mandate certain outcomes at the back end (such as votes cast
in international organizations) for negotiations whose outcomes will not
otherwise be brought to the Senate or Congress for approval. The second
is to treat congressional supremacy over domestic-focused agencies as
constant with respect to both the domestic and foreign activities of these
agencies. The use of these limits would rein in the risks of runaway
presidential power over the content, agents, and information associated
with U.S. international engagement.
Especially in the last thirty years, the executive branch has used its
institutional power to make constitutional fictions about diplomacy into
practical realities. For Congress to regain constitutional clout, it must
bring its own institutional power to bear. The groundwork has already
been laid by Congress’s repeated willingness to enact statutory provisions
asserting control over diplomacy. The challenge for Congress is in getting
the executive branch to recognize these provisions as binding as a matter
of constitutional law. Broadly speaking, Congress can pursue three
strategies towards this end. First, congressional committees can develop
their own accounts of the constitutional allocation of the diplomatic
powers through hearings and reports. Second, Congress can raise the
stakes of executive branch non-compliance through legislative tactics,
such as anti-severability provisions that require the executive branch to
obey mandates whose constitutionality it questions if it wishes to continue
to receive related appropriations. Third, Congress can seek to involve the
courts. This last strategy has both the highest risks and rewards and
therefore should be pursued with particular care.
I focus in this Article on the distribution of constitutional power with
respect to diplomacy, broadly defined. But the account given here
contributes more generally to the literature regarding the separation of
powers. One contribution goes to the existing literature on the role of
OLC. The findings in this Article support those that view OLC as an
enabler of exclusive presidential power—and further suggest that the very
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transparency with which OLC expresses its views helps rather than
hinders this enabling. Another contribution is to complicate some core
assumptions about the role that historical practice plays in separation-ofpowers disputes. While historical practice is often thought to be a tool of
presidential power, it is notable how much historical practice there is—
albeit uncited by OLC—that supports Congress’s authority to issue
mandates with respect to international engagement. This suggests that, as
a structural matter, historical practice may favor findings that Congress
and the President have concurrent powers rather than findings that either
branch has exclusive powers. Finally, this Article serves as a reminder of
how much work needs to be done at the intersection of foreign relations
law and administrative law. Tropes like “diplomacy” conceal complex
questions about the allocation of powers in a world in which there is no
robust divide between what is foreign and what is domestic.
The rest of this Article follows the path described above. Part I
categorizes the diplomatic powers into five discrete powers—power over
representation, recognition, content, agents, and information. Although
Congress disputes the executive branch’s claims to exclusive powers over
the last three of these powers, the executive branch has institutional
advantages that enable it to disregard congressional mandates. Part II
shows that OLC has supplemented the breadth that comes with these five
powers with depth—by defining “diplomacy” far more broadly than is
warranted by evidence from the time of the Framing, historical practice,
or structural constitutional principles. It identifies four lost limits on the
constitutional concept of “diplomacy,” of which one is structural, one is
based in subject matter, one is institutional, and one is tied to the special
status of international organizations. Part III proposes a doctrinal
allocation that provides more control to Congress and identifies
institutional strategies that Congress could deploy to achieve this
distribution. It also notes several broader implications that this Article
holds for the study of the separation of powers.
This Article focuses on the constitutional conflict between Congress
and the Presidency with respect to control over diplomacy. With this
focus come inevitable limitations, two of which deserve specific mention.
First, some of the power struggles described here—particularly regarding
control over agents and information—are entwined with broader
constitutional questions about the extent to which Congress can control
the structure of the executive branch and demand information from it. I
do not address these questions, but rather focus on the extent to which
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power struggles relating to control over international engagement do or
should differ from the broader baseline, whatever it is. The second
limitation is that I focus on legal claims rather than on policy outcomes.
It is possible and indeed often the case that the executive branch will
object on principle to a legislative provision related to diplomacy even
where it is either in full agreement with the policy set forth in this
provision—or willing to adhere to this policy in practice to placate
members of Congress. But while these factors reduce the practical effect
of constitutional disagreements, they are not full substitutes for the
constitutional allocation of control. One of the many grim lessons left
over from the Trump administration is that law rather than norms can be
the only boundary between action and constraint.
I. THE PRESIDENT’S CLAIMS TO EXCLUSIVE DIPLOMATIC POWERS
The OLC considers it “well settled that the Constitution vests the
President with the exclusive authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomatic
relations with other States.”14 A keyword here is “exclusive.” With
respect to most matters of international negotiation, no one doubts that,
from the beginning, the President has had independent power in the face
of congressional silence.15 But OLC’s claims go far further in invoking
exclusive authority, empowering presidents to act as they see fit even if
statutes passed by Congress direct otherwise.
The exclusive executive authority over diplomacy claimed by OLC is
both sweeping and contested. As this Part shows, this authority is actually
a bundle of five discrete powers, each individually significant and
collectively astounding in their scope. And there are good reasons to
question OLC’s constitutional reasoning with respect to three of these
powers. Indeed, our constitutional history is replete with instances where
14
Bill to Relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 19 Op. O.L.C. 123,
124 (1995).
15
There are a few arguable exceptions. One is the President’s power to use special envoys
who have not been approved by the Senate as agents in negotiations. See Scoville, Ad Hoc
Diplomats, supra note 6, at 917–21. Another—also related to a power partly entrusted to the
Senate—is the President’s power to instruct U.S. diplomats engaged in treaty negotiations
without pre-clearing these instructions with the Senate. Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice
and Consent, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 247, 256–60 (2012) (noting that this power was initially
contested during the Washington administration). The Supreme Court has observed that the
President has a “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations,” including
“the lead role . . . in foreign policy” and “a degree of independent authority to act.” Am. Ins.
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Congress has legislated regarding these powers in ways that OLC would
now call unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding their contested nature, OLC’s legal views give the
President a powerful upper hand. For if executive branch officials do not
want to obey a congressional mandate relating to diplomacy, they can get
a legal opinion from OLC excusing them from doing so. Executive branch
actors have invoked this work-around in a range of contexts and, most
recently, the Trump administration used it for several high-stakes issues.
A. The Bundle of Diplomatic Powers
The struggle for control over diplomacy between the executive branch
and Congress is multifaceted. In what follows, I unbundle the diplomatic
powers into five categories: the power to represent the United States
abroad; the power to recognize foreign nations; the power to decide the
content of diplomatic communications; the power to select and control
the agents of diplomacy; and the power to control access to diplomatic
information. These five categories differ not only in their functions but
also in the institutional values which they advance or constrain.
For each category, I first describe its contours and then discuss the
extent to which it is currently the subject of contestation between the
executive branch and Congress. As will be seen, OLC claims that the
President has exclusive control over all these powers (and defines them
broadly), often relying on shoddy reasoning to exaggerate the arguments
in its favor and overlook historical practice to the contrary. By contrast,
Congress continues to legislate in ways that assert authority over aspects
of United States international engagement, including with respect to
content, agents, and information.
1. Power over Representation
The most intuitive of the diplomatic powers—and the one with the
strongest justification for presidential exclusivity—is the power to
represent the United States abroad. While a member of the House of
Representatives in 1800, John Marshall described the President as “the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations,” explaining that “any act to be performed by the
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force of the nation is to be performed through him.”16 By the midtwentieth century, the renowned scholar Edward Corwin would remark
that “there is no more securely established principle of constitutional
practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s
intermediary in its dealing with other nations.”17
The President’s power over representation goes to the process by
which the United States engages abroad. To channel Corwin once again,
this power to serve as the “mouthpiece” of the United States is
analytically distinct from the “power of decision” over what is to be
said.18 Indeed, the President’s power to represent the United States may
have come originally from international rather than constitutional law.
The written Constitution does not specifically assign the power to
represent the United States abroad to either of the political branches.
Reading it, one might think that the right to represent the United States
abroad should be shared between Congress and the President. Congress
is entitled to “declare war,” “regulate commerce with foreign nations,”
and legislate as is “necessary, and proper” to effectuate all vested federal
powers, while the President makes treaties and appoints ambassadors
“with the advice and consent of the Senate,” “receive[s] ambassadors,”
and faithfully executes the laws.19 Yet international law at the time of the
Framing and since has put a heavy thumb on the President’s side of the
scale by channeling diplomatic communications through public ministers
and giving special privileges to heads of state.20
The President’s power over representation gives the President the
exclusive right to communicate diplomatically on behalf of the United
16

10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall) (arguing that the President
therefore had the constitutional authority to carry out an extradition in keeping with the terms
of a pre-existing treaty). As one scholar has observed, “[e]arly on, letters addressed to
Congress from foreign nations were left unopened and sent to the president,” given the
President’s role as the organ of communications. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Living
Presidency: An Originalist Argument Against Its Ever-Expanding Powers 189 (2020).
17
Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787–1957, at 184 (4th ed. 1957).
18
Id. at 178.
19
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
20
See, e.g., Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. IV, §§ 56, 59 (1829) (providing that
the “only way for nations and sovereigns to communicate and adjust their interest is . . . by
means of public ministers” and further observing that those who have “the right . . . of treating
with foreign powers . . . incontestably have also that of sending and receiving public
ministers”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 7, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (providing that “Heads of State,
Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs” are “considered as representing their
State” without needing to produce credentials to that effect).
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States. It is not an exclusive right to control all communication that takes
place between governmental officials within the United States and foreign
counterparts. U.S. history is replete with communication between foreign
governmental actors and independent agencies, members of Congress,
governors, and even local leaders.21 While executive branch actors have
occasionally described such communications as unconstitutional,22
practical reality pushes firmly in the other direction. These other
governmental actors can say what they want with great freedom, and they
have considerable power to make commitments for whatever
governmental units are within their control.23 But the power to formally
speak for the United States—what Ryan Scoville calls sovereign
diplomacy24— lies with the President.
2. Power over Recognition
A second diplomatic power is the recognition power. Recognition
refers to formal acknowledgment for purposes of international law of
another’s international legal status, including “the recognition of states,

21
See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown & David Zaring, The Foreign Affairs of the Federal Reserve,
44 J. Corp. L. 665, 665–67 (2018) (describing how the Federal Reserve Board engages
abroad); Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, supra note 6 (documenting extensive interactions
with foreign governmental officials by members of Congress over time); Julian G. Ku,
Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 Yale L.J. 2380, 2391–96 (2006) (documenting examples
of interactions between governors and other state executives with foreign governmental
officials).
22
By way of example, when Senator Tom Cotton and numerous Republican colleagues sent
an open letter to the leaders of Iran that sought to undercut the Obama administration’s
negotiations with Iran regarding nuclear weapons, Secretary of State John Kerry referred to
this letter as “unconstitutional.” Reena Flores, John Kerry Slams ‘Unconstitutional’ GOP
Letter to Iran, CBS News (Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-kerry-willnot-apologize-for-unconstitutional-gop-letter/ [https://perma.cc/SJ2F-AK8W]. For a
discussion of this issue and an argument that there should be a “converse Youngstown
framework” for evaluating the constitutionality of such actions, see Kristen E. Eichensehr,
Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609, 629–39, 647–
49 (2018).
23
This is true notwithstanding the Logan Act, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613 (1799), which authorizes
the criminal prosecution of U.S. citizens who communicate with foreign governmental agents
in ways aimed at affecting U.S. foreign relations. Although the Logan Act exists on the books,
to date it has seen basically no use in practice. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, supra note 6,
at 352–53 (noting no historic uses against members of Congress and identifying unresolved
questions regarding the reach of the Logan Act).
24
Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, supra note 6, at 334; see also id. at 364 (noting the robust
historical support for “the president as holding exclusive power to engage in sovereign
diplomacy”).
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the recognition of governments, and the recognition of insurgency or
belligerency.”25
The power over recognition is the power to confer status. Like the
power of representation, it serves as a gatekeeper to the rest of diplomacy
on the part of the United States. But where the power of representation is
about who speaks for the United States, the power of recognition is about
whom the United States views as a legitimate counterpart. Closely
associated with this power is the right to determine what foreign powers—
or individual representatives of these foreign powers—the United States
will engage with diplomatically.26
The executive branch has long considered the President to have
exclusive power over recognition. There are reasons to debate this view,
but it is one on which Congress has offered relatively little resistance over
the course of constitutional history.27 And in 2015, the Supreme Court
validated the executive branch’s position, holding that the recognition
power was indeed exclusive to the President. Zivotofsky v. Kerry
considered whether Congress could force the State Department to permit
U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to list “Israel” as their country of birth on
their passports.28 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the five-Justice majority
observed that the clause in Article II providing that the President may
receive ambassadors gave rise to “a logical and proper inference . . . [that
this clause] would be understood to acknowledge his power to recognize

25

2 Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law § 1, at 1 (1963) (also noting its use
with respect to acquisition of territory).
26
See, e.g., Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 20 Op. O.L.C. 189,
193–94 (1996) [hereinafter OLC Opinion of May 15, 1996] (asserting that a congressional
appropriations statute seeking to limit the U.S. diplomatic footprint in Vietnam unless
Vietnam met certain conditions was unconstitutional because the “Executive’s recognition
power necessarily subsumes within itself the power . . . to define the nature and extent of
diplomatic contacts with an as-yet unrecognized government”). A further issue is the extent
to which an exclusive recognition power would imply an exclusive power to determine certain
immunities. Compare Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking,
44 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 911, 951–61 (2011) (arguing that such an exclusive executive power
flows from what the author considers settled exclusive presidential power over diplomacy,
including the recognition power), with Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity
Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 915,
918–21 (2011) (arguing against an exclusive executive power to make certain immunity
decisions).
27
For a careful account of historical practice as it relates to the recognition power, see
generally Reinstein, supra note 6.
28
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 7–9 (2015).
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other nations.”29 In finding the recognition power exclusive to the
President, the Court emphasized that “[t]he weight of historical evidence
indicates Congress has accepted that the power to recognize foreign states
and governments and their territorial bounds is exclusive to the
Presidency.”30 By contrast, the three dissenting Justices expressed
skepticism that the President’s recognition power was exclusive and
reasoned that the case did not implicate the recognition power in any
event.31
In finding that the President had exclusive control over recognition, the
Court took care to signal the narrowness of its holding. It indicated that
the President had some further exclusive diplomatic prerogatives, but it
made no broad pronouncements with respect to control over agents,
content, or information.32 To the contrary, the Court included the
following caution:
The Secretary [of State] now urges the Court to define the executive
power over foreign relations in even broader terms. He contends that
under the Court’s precedent the President has “exclusive authority to
conduct diplomatic relations,” along with “the bulk of foreign-affairs
powers.” . . . This Court declines to acknowledge that unbounded
power. A formulation broader than the rule that the President alone
determines
what
nations
to
formally
recognize
as
legitimate . . . presents different issues and is unnecessary to the
resolution of this case. . . .
In a world that is ever more compressed and interdependent, it is
essential the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and
29
Id. at 12. A sixth Justice—Justice Thomas—concurred in part in the judgment of the
majority. Justice Thomas did not rely on claims particular to the recognition power, however,
but rather argued that the President had a more general exclusive foreign affairs power. Id. at
35–40 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30
Id. at 28.
31
Id. at 64 (Roberts., C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the President has at least a
concurrent power over recognition, but stating “I am not convinced” that this power is
exclusive); Id. at 71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Neither text nor history nor precedent yields a
clear answer to these questions [of exclusivity].”).
32
Id. at 21 (observing that the “President does have a unique role in communicating with
foreign governments, as then-Congressman John Marshall acknowledged”). The Court also
noted in passing that the “President has the sole power to negotiate treaties” and observed that
“Congress may not send an ambassador without his involvement.” Id. at 13. The Court did not
suggest that a sole power to negotiate treaties—which would later be put to the Senate for
advice and consent—amounted to a sole power over the content of all diplomacy, let alone a
sweeping understanding of “diplomacy.” See id. at 20.
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respected. For it is Congress that makes laws, and in countless ways its
laws will and should shape the Nation’s course. . . . It is not for the
President alone to determine the whole content of the Nation’s foreign
policy.33

3. Power over Content
A third power is the authority to control the content of diplomacy. To
what extent can Congress specify U.S. foreign policy objectives and
mandate that the executive branch pursue (or not pursue) certain
negotiating objectives? Can Congress establish waiting periods or other
rules related to the timing of diplomacy? Can Congress direct how the
United States votes in international organizations?
Power over the content of diplomatic communications goes to the
substance of U.S. foreign policy. Unlike the power over representation,
which is about the process of communication, the power over content
directly implicates the principle of democratic control.
At the time of the Framing, the issue of control over content arose
mostly in relation to treaties—which require the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senate prior to ratification. Practice in the Washington
Administration established that the President could develop negotiating
instructions against a backdrop of silence from the Senate but did not
address whether the President could give instructions that contradicted a
mandate from the Senate.34
In 1816, the newly formed Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted
that the “President is the constitutional representative of the United States
with regard to foreign nations,” and expressed its view that the President
“must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon
what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of

33
Id. at 19–21; see also id. at 67 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s decision
to “allow[] the President to defy an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs” as a
“perilous step”). The Court also signaled disapproval of expansive dicta favoring exclusive
presidential foreign affairs powers from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1936). Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 20–21. For discussion of the ambivalence of
Zivotofsky with respect to broader exclusive executive power over diplomacy, see Harlan
Grant Cohen, Agora: Reflections on Zivotofsky v. Kerry: Zivotofsky II’s Two Visions for
Foreign Relations Law, 109 AJIL Unbound 10, 14–15 (2015).
34
See Galbraith, supra note 15, at 256–60 (noting how this power was initially contested
during the Washington administration).
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success.”35 In cautioning the Senate to leave negotiations to the President,
however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee neither said that the
Senate was constitutionally obligated to do so nor directly opined on
whether the President had the constitutional power to disregard direction
from the Senate. The Committee emphasized that the Senate would later
have the right to approve or disapprove the ultimate product of
negotiations, observing that “the more separate and distinct in practice the
negotiating and treaty-ratifying powers are kept, the more safe the
national interests.”36
Questions of control over diplomatic content arose in other settings
during the nineteenth century. In one incident in the 1820s, President John
Quincy Adams sought an appropriation for a U.S. diplomat to attend an
international conference, and Congress debated whether to include
negotiation instructions in the appropriation. In a speech on the floor of
the House, Daniel Webster resisted this inclusion because he considered
that “the giving of instructions to Ministers abroad” was “an exercise of
Executive power.”37 He felt that Congress should not instruct specific
diplomats, but he also made explicit his view that Congress could exert
control over the overall content of U.S. foreign policy. Webster had “[n]o
doubt” that the executive branch could maintain a negotiating position
with respect to Cuba “only so long as it receives the approbation and
support of Congress,” adding that “[i]f Congress be of the opinion that
[the current] course of policy is wrong, then he agreed it was in the power,
and he thought, indeed, the duty of Congress to interfere, and to express
its dissent.”38
Today, the executive branch claims total constitutional control over the
content of diplomacy. A commonly used phrase by OLC and in some
presidential signing statements is that the President has “exclusive
constitutional authority to determine the time, scope, and objectives of
international negotiations.”39 Notably, this sweeping phrase dates to the
1980s—about two hundred years after the Framing—and was brought
35

S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., Rep. of Feb. 15, 1816, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. (1816), reprinted
in 6 Compilation of Reports of Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 1789–1901, at
21 (1901) [hereinafter 1816 SFRC Report].
36
Id. at 22.
37
9 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, at 94 (1858) (statement of
Rep. Webster in April 1826).
38
Id.
39
Statement on Signing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,
2017 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 201700559 (Aug. 2, 2017).
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into OLC parlance by William Barr in 1990.40 In the view of the executive
branch, Congress can never mandate that the executive branch initiate
negotiations, pursue specified negotiating objectives, adhere to a waiting
period prior to finalizing an agreement, absent itself from certain
negotiations, or veto a Security Council resolution. Nor can Congress
control U.S. diplomacy at a high level of generality by establishing the
strategic goals, while leaving tactical decisions to the executive branch.
Congress cannot even use the phrase “it is the policy of the United States”
with respect to matters of foreign policy.41

40

The first approximate use of this phrase that I have found came in a signing statement by
President Ronald Reagan in 1987. Reagan 1987 Signing Statement, supra note 7 (“I construe
these [statutory] provisions as being subject to my exclusive authority to determine the time,
scope, and objectives of any negotiations.”). OLC first incorporated this phrase into a legal
memorandum several years later and has used it frequently since. See Issues Raised by Foreign
Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 41 (1990) [hereinafter OLC Opinion of Feb.
16, 1990] (describing President Reagan’s signing statement in a parenthetical as “invoking the
President’s ‘exclusive authority to determine the time, scope, and objectives’ on any
international negotiations”); Legis. Prohibiting Spending for Delegations to U.N. Agencies
Chaired By Countries That Support Int’l Terrorism, 33 Op. O.L.C. 221, 231 (2009)
[hereinafter OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009] (citing prior uses).
41
For example, even as the Trump administration emphasized the need to prevent Iran from
developing ballistic missiles that could launch nuclear weapons, it objected to language along
these lines from Congress as intruding on the President’s exclusive diplomatic powers.
Compare Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iranstrategy/ [https://perma.cc/4GC2-GBKD] (noting that it is “totally important” to “prevent Iran
from developing . . . an intercontinental ballistic missile,” and expressing support for a
congressional bill on this issue), with Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs. 1 (Nov. 9, 2017) (quoting in part
the Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act, H.R. 1968, 115th
Cong.
§ 2(b)
(2017)),
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1019941/download
[https://perma.cc/QR2S-FD3K] (objecting on constitutional grounds to a provision stating that
it “is the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from undertaking any activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” since this provision
“is apparently intended to require the Executive Branch to initiate contact with foreign partners
relating to specific topics and to advance specified objectives”). The Department of Justice
took a similar position during the Obama administration. See Letter from Ronald Weich,
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affs. 1–2 (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ola/legacy/2011/11/08/
110111-ltr-re-hr-1905-iran-threat-reduction-act-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RQK8-KKLJ]
(discussing the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011))
(objecting to similar language in a proposed bill on the ground that declaring the “policy of
the United States” would “purport[] to state a general national policy that would encompass
positions taken by the United States in international discussions and negotiations”). It is
unclear whether, as a matter of interpretation, language specifying “the policy of the United
States” creates legal obligations. Is it more a substantive mandate or more like a preamble?
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Instead, under the executive branch’s view, Congress has no direct
power over diplomacy and can exert only persuasion or indirect power.
As to persuasion, Congress can promise carrots to the executive branch if
it adheres to congressional preferences—such as by promising to give upor-down votes to trade agreements whose negotiations track to
congressionally determined aims.42 As to indirect power, Congress can
influence the content of diplomacy through legislation that on its face is
unrelated to communication between nations. For example, Congress can
mandate sanctions on a particular country, and these sanctions will
undoubtedly cast a shadow on any negotiating positions taken by the
executive branch in relation to that country. Congressional inaction can
similarly have indirect effects on negotiations. In the absence of domestic
cap-and-trade legislation, for example, the executive branch knows that it
should not commit the United States internationally to a cap-and-trade
program unless this commitment is made contingent on the later
obtainment of implementing legislation. These are important constraints
in practice, but they do not serve as direct limits on how the executive
branch interacts with foreign counterparts or within international
organizations.
In support of its views, OLC largely cites back to its own prior
positions. Where it cites to historical precedents—like the 1816 SFRC
report and the Daniel Webster remarks—it does so in questionable ways.
As to the 1816 SFRC report, OLC treats it as supporting the broader claim
that Congress may not “purport[] to impose statutory restrictions” on “the
President’s authority to determine whether, how, when, and through
whom to engage in foreign diplomacy.”43 OLC does not recognize that
central to the 1816 report (which involved the Senate rather than
Congress) was the recognition that the Senate would have a chance to
review the end product of diplomacy—the treaty—through its advice and
But it is clear that the executive branch views this language as constitutionally objectionable
in statutes addressing issues of foreign affairs.
42
For a recent example, see the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–26, § 103(b)(3), (c)(1), 129 Stat. 320, 335, which
President Obama signed into law without making a signing statement.
43
OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009, supra note 40, at 230; see also OLC Opinion of Feb. 16,
1990, supra note 40, at 41 (quoting the 1816 SFRC Report, supra note 35, at 21) (supporting
certain broad presidential powers with respect to diplomacy and then simply stating that these
powers “cannot be circumscribed by statute”). For a critique of the conclusion reached in the
first of the memos cited in this footnote, see generally Rachel Sussman, Note, The Power of
Parlay: Control of the Diplomacy Power Between Congress and the Executive, 8 Geo. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 537, 554–57 (2010).
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consent process. This premise does not hold for most types of
international engagement today, as very few negotiations lead to Article
II treaties or even to agreements that will be subsequently put to Congress
for approval.44 Similarly, OLC mentions the Webster remarks only as
sources of support for claims of exclusive presidential powers over
diplomacy and never discusses the way in which they undermine these
claims with respect to the content of diplomacy.45
Despite claims to exclusive control over the content of diplomacy made
by the executive branch, Congress has passed many, many statutes
asserting control over the content of U.S. international engagement.
Congress has used the phrase “the policy of the United States,” in
legislation relating to diplomatic objectives long before OLC started
objecting to this phrase—indeed since long before OLC even existed as
an institution.46 And the pages of the United States Statutes at Large have
many examples of more granular commands as well. Congress sometimes
mandates specifically that “the President shall negotiate” on a particular
issue, as in “[t]he President shall negotiate suitable arrangements with the
Republic of Panama whereby each nation shall agree to take all measures
within its legal authority to assure that members of [a] Board of the

44

See Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Failed Transparency
Regime for Executive Agreements: An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 134 Harv. L. Rev.
629, 632–33 (2020) (noting that most international agreements made by the United States
today are done not as treaties, but rather as executive agreements that do not receive the
subsequent consent of Congress).
45
Presidential Certification Regarding the Provision of Documents to the House of
Representatives Under the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, 20 Op. O.L.C. 253, 273
n.66 (1996) [hereinafter OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996]; OLC Opinion of May 15, 1996,
supra note 26, at 197 n.18.
46
For a few early examples, see H.R.J. Res. 48, 46th Cong., 21 Stat. 308 (1880) (“Whereas,
it is the policy of the United States to permit its own citizens and the citizens of France, Spain,
Italy, and Austria to freely engage” in certain trade.); Defense Production Act of 1950, ch.
932, § 2, 64 Stat. 798 (“It is the policy of the United States to oppose acts of aggression and
to promote peace by insuring . . . the peaceful settlement of differences among nations.”). For
some later examples, see Food for Peace Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–808, § 2, 80 Stat. 1526
(“The Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to expand international
trade . . . .”); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–242, § 2, 92 Stat. 120
(“[I]t is the policy of the United States to . . . actively pursue through international initiatives[,]
mechanisms for [nuclear] fuel supply assurances.”). The executive branch has not always
honored congressional pronouncements about U.S. foreign policy. See Eli E. Nobleman,
Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign Relations, 289 Annals of Am.
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 145, 154–55 (1953) (describing an instance in which the executive
branch disregarded a policy pronouncement accompanied by a request to host a conference).
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Commission comply with [a specified] code of conduct.”47 Other
statutory provisions use slightly different phrasing, such as a 1996 statute
stating that “[t]he President shall seek to develop, in coordination
with . . . other countries . . . a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to
bring democracy to . . . Burma.”48 Neither these examples nor the
accompanying ones mentioned below in footnotes, triggered executive
branch objections in the form of signing statements. While Congress may
be content to leave most decisions about the content of diplomacy to the
executive branch, this legislation demonstrates a congressional view that
Congress is entitled to pass legislative mandates about the content of
international engagement if it so chooses.

47

Act of Sept. 27, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–70, § 1112(d), 93 Stat. 460; see also Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–500, § 7, 86 Stat. 816, 898
(“[T]he President shall negotiate multilateral treaties, conventions, resolutions, or other
agreements, and formulate, present, or support proposals at the United Nations and other
appropriate international forums” seeking certain uniform standards and controls over
pollution.). I focus here on statutory provisions that use “shall” or otherwise sound like
mandates, as these are the ones in which Congress’s assertion of power is most forceful.
Congress commonly weighs in using more permissive language (e.g., “The President should,”
or “The President is requested”) and also often uses language that connotates a delegation of
authority but not a directive to act (e.g., “The President is authorized”). For an example of
both permissive and delegating language, see Act of July 26, 1911, ch. 3, § 3, 37 Stat. 4, 12
(“[T]he President . . . is authorized and requested to negotiate trade agreements with the
Dominion of Canada.”).
48
Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 570(c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–166. In a
decision about foreign affairs federalism, the Supreme Court noted this statutory provision in
passing without expressing any concerns about its legality. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (noting that “Congress’s express command to the President
to take the initiative for the United States among the international community invested him
with the maximum authority of the National Government, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,
343 U.S., at 635, in harmony with the President’s own constitutional powers”); see also Lori
Fisler Damrosch, Treaties and International Regulation, 98 ASIL Proc. 349, 351 (2004)
(noting that the Supreme Court in Crosby “cast no doubt whatsoever on [the provision’s]
constitutionality as between Congress and the president”). For a few other variants, see Act of
Nov. 22, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98–164, § 118, 97 Stat. 1022 (“The President shall use every
available means at his disposal to ensure that the 1985 Conference to commemorate the
conclusion of the United Nations Decade for Women is not dominated by political issues
extraneous to the goals of the 1985 Women’s Conference.”); Act of Aug. 27, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99–399 § 601, 100 Stat. 853, 874–75 (“The Congress hereby directs the President . . . to
seek universal adherence to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
[and] to seek agreement in the United Nations Security Council” respecting nuclear
terrorism.). For some other directives, largely aimed at members of the executive branch other
than the President, see Ryan M. Scoville, Compelled Diplomacy in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 9
N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 9–10 (2014).
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Voting in international organizations is a special form of diplomatic
engagement—not just talk, but also an act of international legal
significance. The executive branch now claims that it has exclusive
control over how the United States casts its votes.49 Yet Congress has long
asserted control with respect to votes, including on many occasions
without objections from the executive branch.50 As one significant
example, Congress specified in a 1947 statute that the United States
would “waive[] the exercise of any veto” in the U.N. Security Council on
the subject of aid to Greece or Turkey.51 As President Truman’s Secretary
of State explained in his memoirs, this provision was deemed “a cheap
price for [a leading senator’s] patronage and warmly welcomed by . . . our
representative at the United Nations.”52 There is no implication that
executive branch actors doubted the constitutionality of this provision;
rather, the implication is one of acquiescence.53 Yet this statutory
precedent finds no mention in OLC memoranda.
4. Power over Agents
A fourth diplomatic power relates to the agents of diplomacy. The
Constitution’s Appointments Clause provides that the President “shall
49
See, e.g., DOJ Letter of Mar. 5, 2018, supra note 2, at 1–2; Daugirdas, supra note 6, at
519–20 (“Every president since George H. W. Bush has issued signing statements objecting
that these legislated instructions [including on how U.S. representatives to the World Bank
should vote] impinge on the president’s exclusive constitutional authority to engage in
international negotiations.”).
50
Daugirdas recounts this history with respect to the World Bank. Daugirdas, supra note 6,
at 526–33 (listing many examples). In the early days of international organizations, Congress
sometimes sought to assert even more control. See Act of July 1, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64–131,
39 Stat. 252, 260 (“The duly appointed representative of the United States on the Permanent
Commission of the International Geodetic Association is hereby granted authority to vote with
the representatives on the permanent commission from other nations on all matters coming
before the association . . . subject to the approval of Congress.”).
51
Act of May 22, 1947, ch. 81, Pub. L. No. 80–75, § 5, 61 Stat. 103, 105.
52
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department 223–24 (1969).
53
See id. at 224. There is also at least a touch of historical practice to support Congress’s
ability to exercise control over whether the United States signs an international agreement. In
appropriating money in 1924 for a conference aimed at renegotiating the Opium Convention,
Congress provided that “the representative of the United States shall sign no agreement which
does not fulfill [certain] conditions necessary for the suppression of the habit-forming narcotic
drug traffic.” H.R.J. 195, ch. 155, 43 Stat. 119, 120 (1924). The head of the U.S. negotiating
team—who happened to be the same member of Congress who had proposed this limitation—
cited this requirement in withdrawing the United States from the conference. See Nobleman,
supra note 46, at 156 & n.60 and accompanying text (noting, however, that “no attention
appears to have been paid to the instructions” in a subsequent conference seven years later).
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nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, [and] other public Ministers and Consuls.”54 This
language suggests that the selection of diplomats requires joint
acceptance by the President and the Senate. This language does not
explicitly address broader organizational questions, like who has the
authority to create offices and whether Congress can assign specific tasks
to specific offices.
Like the power over representation, the power over the agents of
diplomacy is about process. But unlike the power over representation, the
power over agents is focused inward rather than outward. It is not about
which branch communicates with the rest of the world on behalf of the
United States, but rather about how the actors within the executive branch
are chosen, empowered, and supervised. Executive branch lawyers now
claim that presidents can exercise exclusive control over the agents of
diplomacy. These claims offer the President ways to bypass both the
Senate advice and consent process for appointees and congressional
mandates regarding how the executive branch conducts diplomacy.
While many executive branch actors who participate in diplomacy are
Senate-approved, presidents consider themselves entitled to conduct
diplomacy through agents who have not received Senate approval. Ryan
Scoville’s work aptly describes how presidents came to claim the right to
use special envoys for diplomacy, in large part by aggressively
overreading early precedents.55 This proclaimed right means that, with
respect to diplomacy, the President can circumvent the Senate’s advice
and consent power whenever the President wishes to do so. In the Trump
administration, for example, Jared Kushner never received a Senateconfirmed appointment but had a diplomatic portfolio that included the
Middle East peace process.56
In addition to the power to use special envoys, Presidents claim an
exclusive right to decide who participates in negotiations. Early in
constitutional history, there was debate over whether Congress could
establish diplomatic offices, but by the early twentieth century “Congress
ha[d] gained power at the expense of the executive . . . in the matter of

54

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, supra note 6, at 917–21 (describing these claims of authority
and arguing they are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning).
56
Id. at 908–11.
55
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appointments.”57 Congress has frequently established particular offices
and assigned portfolios to these offices, as with the requirement that the
President “shall appoint” an ambassador to the United Nations who “shall
represent the United States in the Security Council of the United
Nations.”58 Especially since the 1990s, however, the executive branch has
resisted congressional efforts to limit who can occupy these offices or to
insist that certain negotiations go through certain offices. In 1996, for
example, OLC declared unconstitutional a congressional requirement that
the U.S. Trade Representative could not have previously advised a foreign
government in trade negotiations.59 And in 2011, OLC stated that
Congress could not bar the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy from collaborating with China because of the
President’s “exclusive constitutional authority to choose the agents who
will engage” in diplomatic communications.60
Notwithstanding these executive branch claims, past legislation reveals
ample instances in which Congress has exercised control in ways that the
executive branch now resists. In addition to structuring the bureaucracies
of diplomacy, Congress has passed many statutes specifying that certain
executive branch actors shall undertake negotiations and at times, also

57
Henry M. Wriston, American Participation in International Conferences, 20 Am. J. Int’l
L. 33, 33–34 (1926) (discussing various nineteenth century statutes and how initial resistance
by the executive branch to these statutes gradually dwindled). For an account of the earlier
practice in which the Washington administration fended off legislative mandates regarding
diplomatic grades, see Powell, supra note 5, at 41–47.
58
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, Pub. L. No. 79–264, § 2(a), 59 Stat.
619. For a discussion of this practice and, more generally, of constitutional issues related to
the establishment of diplomatic offices, see Ryan M. Scoville, Unqualified Ambassadors, 69
Duke L.J. 71, 149–66 (2019).
59
Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointment of U.S. Trade Representative, 20 Op.
O.L.C. 279, 279–80 (1996) (determining that “the restriction is particularly egregious because
the office in question involves representation of the United States to foreign governments—
an area constitutionally committed to the President”).
60
OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 125; see also, e.g., Letter from Stephen
E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affs. 3–4 (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/
1035286/download [https://perma.cc/6NPT-3YQG] (“The President has exclusive authority
to identify the agents who will engage in diplomatic activity.”); Letter from Prim F. Escalona,
Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Sen. James Inhofe, Chairman of
the S. Comm. on Armed Servs. 6 (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ola/
page/file/1222061/download [https://perma.cc/E6SW-4JS7] (objecting that while a particular
statutory provision “would allow the President to enter into a cybersecurity agreement with
Russia through the Department of the Defense, it would effectively disallow the President
from using other agents, such as the Secretary of State, from doing the same”).
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specifying that these actors should consult with particular other persons
in the process.61 This practice has antecedents that go back to 1792, when
Congress specified by statute that “the Postmaster General may make
arrangements with the postmasters in any foreign country for the
reciprocal receipt and delivery of letters and packets.”62
5. Power over Information
A final power over diplomacy is power over information. To what
extent can Congress mandate that the executive branch provide it with
information related to diplomacy?
This power over information is about oversight. If Congress has no
authority to obtain information from the executive branch about
diplomacy, then it cannot ensure that executive branch officials are acting
wisely and lawfully. On the other hand, if confidential information is
obtained by Congress and then inappropriately released, there may be
problematic consequences for the United States on the international stage.
Disputes between Congress and the President over access to
diplomacy-related information go back to the beginning of our
constitutional history. In 1794, President Washington withheld some
61
See, e.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No.
102–138, § 301(b), 105 Stat. 647, 707 (1991) (“The Secretary of State shall designate a high
level official with responsibility for . . . [developing] a proposal for the prosecution of Persian
Gulf War criminals in an international tribunal, including proposing in the United Nations the
establishment of such a tribunal, and advising the United States Permanent Representative to
the United Nations in any discussion or negotiations concerning such matters.”); Compact of
Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–239, § 102, 99 Stat. 1770, 1775–76 (1986)
(providing that the President shall negotiate law enforcement assistance agreements with the
Marshall Islands and that “[a]ny official, designated by this joint resolution or by the President
to negotiate any agreement under this section, shall consult with affected law enforcement
agencies prior to entering into such an agreement on behalf of the United States”); Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96–283, § 118, 94 Stat. 553, 575 (1980)
(providing that a particular administrative official “in consultation with the Secretary of
State . . . shall consult with foreign nations which enact, or are preparing to enact, domestic
legislation establishing an interim legal framework” for mineral extraction); Fish and Wildlife
Act of 1956, ch. 1036, Pub. L. No. 84–1024, § 8, 70 Stat. 1119, 1123 (“The Secretary of State
shall designate the Secretary of the Interior or [a subordinate], . . . as a member of the United
States delegation attending [international] . . . meetings” about fish and wildlife and “shall
consult” with the Secretary of Interior with regard to all international aid that relates to fish
and wildlife.). Congress directed authorizations to specific agency actors for negotiations with
Native American tribes as well. E.g., Act of Apr. 23, 1872, ch. 115, 17 Stat. 55 (“That the
Secretary of the Interior be, and he is hereby, authorized and empowered to enter into
negotiations with the Ute Indians.”).
62
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239.
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information regarding diplomatic communications requested by the
Senate, with his Attorney General reasoning that the Senate was not
entitled to these papers unless its advice and consent was being sought for
a relevant appointment or treaty.63 Again, in 1796, Washington withheld
papers related to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty from the House of
Representatives, reasoning that the House had no role in treaty-making
and thus no purpose for asking for the papers unless it was pursuing an
impeachment.64 He observed that “the power of making treaties is
exclusively vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate,” and “in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation . . . were
laid before the Senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their
consideration and advice.”65
The Jay Treaty precedent might be thought to be comparatively
modest. It involved a resolution passed by only one House of Congress,
not a statute.66 It involved papers given to the Senate but kept from the
House based not on claims of presidential power but rather on the House’s
lack of jurisdiction. And like many other precedents cited by the executive
branch, it revealed not constitutional consensus but rather constitutional
controversy—after all, the House thought it had a right to see the papers.
Yet this precedent has empowered a long line of periodic resistance by
the executive branch to sharing diplomatic information with Congress.67
63
Message from George Washington to the U.S. Senate (Feb. 26, 1794), in 1 A Compilation
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897, at 152 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897); Letter from Edmund Randolph to President George Washington (Jan. 26, 1794),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-15-02-0099#print_view
[https://perma.cc/5YCN-9JHE] (also suggesting that, in its legislative capacity, the Senate can
consider papers but “the President [can] interpose[] his discretion, so as to give them no more,
than, in his judgment, is fit to be given”).
64
Message from George Washington to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796),
in 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, supra note 63, at 194–96.
65
Id. at 195; see also OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 272 n.62 (noting that
“Washington relied in part on the exclusion of the House from the treaty power” but claiming
that Washington was really asserting a broader power to “withhold documents when the public
interest so required”).
66
In an 1854 legal opinion, the Attorney General emphasized the difference between a onehouse resolution and a statute with regard to the provision of information. See Resolutions of
Congress, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 680, 683 (1854) (stating that “except where otherwise provided
by law,” a resolution passed by only one house of Congress could not compel a cabinet
secretary to provide information without the consent of the President and giving the example
of a demand by the House for the Secretary of State to provide information about diplomatic
instructions (emphasis added)).
67
See OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 272–76, 272 n.63, 273 n.64
(discussing these precedents); OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 13–14 (same).
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The executive branch now claims that “[i]nterwoven with the President’s
constitutional authority to conduct diplomatic relations is his
constitutional authority to determine whether to disclose the content of
international negotiations.”68 In light of this, the “President . . . possesses,
as a matter of constitutional law, the authority to exercise independent
judgment about whether it is in the public interest to disclose such
information to Congress.”69 OLC maintains that “the President’s
authority over diplomatic information, unlike certain other
constitutionally grounded privileges, is not subject to balancing: it is
absolute.”70
The exclusive power to withhold information has long been claimed by
the executive branch despite numerous congressional statutes requiring
the provision of diplomacy-related information.71 Reporting requirements
are quite common. In supporting U.S. participation in the United Nations,
for example, Congress mandated that “[t]he President shall, . . . not less
than once each year, make reports to the Congress of the activities of the
United Nations and of the participation of the United States therein.”72
Similarly, Congress has sought on occasion to bring administrative law
This claimed privilege has become wrapped up in “executive privilege,” a broader concept
that derives in part from diplomatic privilege.
68
OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 267; see also, e.g., DOJ Letter of Mar.
5, 2018, supra note 2, at 4, (objecting to disclosure to congressional staff with proper security
clearances); Letter from Samuel R. Ramer, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
to Sen. Bob Corker, Chairman of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations 1–2 (June 5, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1058581/download
[https://perma.cc/PN2D-ZB3F]
(citing a “constitutional authority to maintain the confidentiality of diplomatic
communications” in objecting to a bill’s various reporting requirements related to North
Korea).
69
OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 268.
70
Id. at 277 (citing for authority to two never-published OLC opinions).
71
For a few examples of statutory mandates for disclosure, see Compact of Free Association
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–239, § 102(c), 99 Stat. 1770, 1777 (1986) (providing that the
President, in consultation with the U.S. Comptroller General, shall negotiate agreements that
give the General Accounting Office—which is part of the legislative branch—certain auditing
powers with respect to aid programs to Micronesia and that the Comptroller General shall
have “access to [the] personnel and . . . records, documents, working papers, automated data
and files, and other information relevant to such review”); Department of State Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98–164, § 118, 97 Stat. 1017, 1022 (1983)
(“Prior to the [international] 1985 Conference, the President shall report to the Congress on
the nature of the preparations, the adherence to the original goals of the Conference, and the
extent of any continued United States participation and support for the Conference.”).
72
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, Pub. L. No. 79–264, § 4, 59 Stat. 619,
620; see also 22 U.S.C. § 287b (codifying this and numerous other reporting requirements
related to the United Nations).
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practices relating to notice and comment into the conduct of agencies
operating abroad. A 1994 statute, for example, provides that the U.S.
agency engaged in international standard-setting for agriculture shall give
annual notice and an opportunity to comment with respect to upcoming
negotiations and “the agenda for United States participation, if any.”73
The tension between these two positions has been mitigated historically
by the President’s willingness to share information related to international
engagement in practice. In a 1996 memo determining that Congress could
not use its appropriations power to compel the disclosure of negotiations
regarding Mexico’s currency crisis, for example, OLC nonetheless
emphasized that the executive branch had disclosed almost all the
requested information.74 Such an institutional balance is dependent on
norms, however, and is vulnerable to disregard by an administration. The
Trump administration notably refused to provide Congress with a
statutorily mandated copy of a report related to potential automobile
tariffs and rejected demands by the House of Representatives for
information relating to President Trump’s dealings with Russia.75 More
generally, under the Trump administration, the Department of Justice
became far more strident in claiming that reporting requirements raise
“constitutional concern[s]” without even considering whether the public
interests do or do not favor disclosure.76 One 2019 letter sent by the
Department of Justice to Congress complained that numerous reportingrelated obligations in a proposed statute aimed at sanctioning Hamas
“would unconstitutionally intrude on the President’s authority to control

73
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, § 491, 108 Stat. 4809, 4970–71
(1994).
74
OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 256–57, 259–60 (describing substantial
disclosure and an eventual negotiated agreement “regarding the small number of White House
documents withheld under the public interest exception”).
75
E.g., Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., to Rep. Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., U.S. H. of Reps.
1–2
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1248726/download
[https://perma.cc/PS4S-FLTU] [hereinafter DOJ Letter of Feb. 11, 2020]; Letter from Pat A.
Cipollone, Coun. to the President, The White House, to Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman
of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform 2 (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.politico.com/
f/?id=00000169-a165-d9c1-a7ef-f5effbf10001
[https://perma.cc/4AXM-KG9H];
OLC
Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11–14.
76
E.g., DOJ Letter of Feb. 11, 2020, supra note 75, at 1 (stating, without analyzing the
interests at stake, that two reporting requirements in a draft bill “would contravene the
diplomatic-communications component of executive privilege”).
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the dissemination of national security information and diplomatic
communications.”77
B. The President’s Practical Control over Contested Diplomatic Powers
In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson explained that “[w]hen
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . Courts can sustain
exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject.”78 He warned that “Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized
with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system.”79
Underlying this famous language is the assumption of judicial review.
Justice Jackson presumed that courts would be determining those
exclusive presidential powers. Unlike the political branches, the courts
are not patently self-interested in the constitutional balance of power
between Congress and the President. Their comparative institutional
credibility makes it plausible that they can undertake the robust scrutiny
envisioned by Justice Jackson.
Yet only rarely have courts considered the constitutional allocation of
the diplomatic powers. It was not until 2015, in Zivotofsky, that the
Supreme Court squarely addressed the exclusivity of one piece of the
bundle of diplomatic powers and held that the recognition power was
exclusive to the President.80 While evidence from the time of the Framing
and historical practice comfortably support an exclusive presidential
power over the representation power (another piece of the bundle),81 it is
judicially unsettled to what extent the President has exclusive power over
77
Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
to Rep. Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs. 1–3 (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1203301/download [https://perma.cc/3E39-Z325].
78
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
79
Id. at 638.
80
See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 32 (2015). Review of the exclusivity of the
diplomatic powers from lower courts has similarly been minimal. An exception is a 1993 case
in which a majority of a Ninth Circuit panel held, with minimal reasoning, that a statute
requiring the Secretary of State to initiate certain negotiations regarding sea turtles could not
be enforced because it “impinge[d] upon power exclusively granted to the Executive Branch
under the Constitution.” Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1993).
81
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960) (“The President . . . is the constitutional
representative of the United States in its dealings with foreign nations.”).
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the content, agents, and information related to U.S. international
engagement. The Court, in Zivotofsky, made clear that it was only
addressing exclusivity with respect to the recognition power.82
Without the courts, it is left to the political branches to sort out their
respective powers, and this sorting does not lend itself to Justice Jackson’s
admonition that claims of exclusive presidential power “must be
scrutinized with caution.”83 Rather, it creates a dynamic where the
executive branch can always win if it really wants to. The executive
branch is far better positioned than Congress both to articulate its legal
positions and to implement them in practice.
With respect to the articulation of legal positions, the executive branch
has enormous institutional capacity to put towards asserting exclusive
powers. It has regiments of lawyers at OLC and elsewhere who are
committed to protecting its prerogatives.84 Indeed, an OLC opinion
provides that “[w]here the President believes that [a congressional]
enactment unconstitutionally limits his powers, he has the authority to
defend his office and decline to abide by it, unless he is convinced that
the Court would disagree with his assessment.”85 Through letters, signing
statements, memoranda, and other tools, the executive branch has built up
an arsenal of internal precedents asserting exclusive rights with respect to
diplomatic content, agents, and information. Congress, by contrast, has
no institutional parallel to OLC, and members of Congress have fewer
incentives to defend its institutional prerogatives.86
The executive branch also has greater institutional capacity to
implement its perceived rights. During the legislative process, executive
branch officials can resist perceived congressional overreaching by
asking for changes in draft bills, and the President can issue signing
statements.87 And the executive branch has even greater institutional
82

Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 20.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
84
Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev.
1448, 1459–63 (2010); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 441–44 (2012) (discussing the institutional
advantages of the executive branch).
85
Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199,
201 (1994) (emphasis added).
86
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 84, at 442–43.
87
The President can also use the veto power, but this is less likely to occur. The President
might wish to gain the passage of the legislation if the objectionable portions are only a small
piece of it—as is often the case with “must pass” annual bills like the National Defense
Authorization Act. The presidential incentives to use the veto are also lessened under the
83
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powers after the legislation has passed. It can construe congressional
statutes narrowly to avoid perceived interference with its asserted
exclusive powers. Most importantly, it can disregard statutory provisions
altogether, even when Congress is exercising its potent power of the
purse.88
This is not to say that the executive branch will always disregard
congressional mandates or preferences relating to diplomacy. Far from it.
These interests will often align, and, even when they do not, executive
branch actors can face strong, pragmatic incentives to accommodate
congressional views. This may be especially true where the actions of
agencies rather than the White House are at stake. Kristina Daugirdas’s
work here is informative. She studied the extent to which the Treasury
Department implemented congressional directives regarding how to vote
in international financial organizations after the executive branch started
raising constitutional objections to these directives during the George
H.W. Bush presidency. In an illustration of the daylight between
constitutional assertions and practice, she found that “President Bush’s
constitutional objections had no impact on the Treasury Department’s
long-standing practice of implementing Congress’s negotiating
instructions” and that trend generally continued in subsequent years.89
Congress can also cast a powerful indirect shadow on the conduct of
U.S. international engagement through laws that are fully within its
power. Much of U.S. international engagement today involves
negotiations with other countries about how the executive branch will use
powers that Congress has delegated to it. Will the President impose or
waive economic sanctions on a particular country? What standards will
the Environmental Protection Agency set under the Clean Air Act with
respect to climate emissions? If Congress changes the underlying
statutes—or delegates further powers to the President—this will
inevitably affect negotiating leverage and outcomes. Similarly, Congress
can make funding decisions related to foreign policy that will have
current equilibrium by the fact that the President considers himself or herself empowered to
disregard statutory provisions that OLC views as unconstitutional infringements on executive
power.
88
E.g., OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 116–17; OLC Opinion of May 15,
1996, supra note 26, at 194; OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, supra note 40, at 37–38, 41; see
also Price, supra note 6, at 450 (“While Congress routinely conditions appropriations on
particular diplomatic constraints, the executive branch just as routinely claims authority to
disregard those conditions.”).
89
Daugirdas, supra note 6, at 544–49.
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collateral effects on negotiations. If Congress refuses to fund any
international organizations that treat Palestine as a state, then the United
States may no longer be able to participate as a dues-paying member in
these international organizations. Legislation in these spaces will
influence how the executive branch engages with counterparts abroad.
Yet at the end of the day, the President or other executive branch
officials can now choose to disregard any statutory mandate that conflicts
with OLC’s sweeping views of the President’s exclusive diplomatic
powers. And they have done so even in the administrations of President
Clinton and President Obama, notwithstanding the general perception that
Democratic presidents are less likely to claim exclusive executive
powers.90 As for the Trump administration, it proved especially
aggressive in withholding information related to international affairs from
Congress, including virtually all documents related to President Trump’s
first impeachment.91 In the fall of 2020, the Trump administration also
relied in part on the President’s supposedly exclusive powers over the
content of diplomacy in withdrawing the United States from an important
treaty—the Open Skies Treaty—in a manner that conflicted with a
statutory mandate.92 To date, the Biden administration has been less
overtly energetic in using the exclusive executive powers over diplomacy
claimed by previous administrations. Even if the Biden administration

90
E.g., OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 116–19; OLC Opinion of June 28,
1996, supra note 45, at 253.
91
OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11–14 (offering several interrelated
reasons, including diplomatic power, in withholding a memorandum related to automobile
tariffs); see generally House Committees’ Authority to Investigate for Impeachment, 44 Op.
O.L.C. __, slip op. at 1–2, 50–51 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1236346/download
[https://perma.cc/VMC4-HXA8] (setting out convoluted arguments for withholding
impeachment-related documents and asserting, among these arguments, that executive
privilege “continues to be available during an impeachment investigation”).
92
OLC Opinion of Sept. 22, 2020, supra note 1, at 17 (quotation marks and citations
omitted) (stating that “Congress may not constitutionally dictate the modes and means by
which the President engages in international diplomacy” and therefore “may not compel,
restrict, or delay the President’s diplomatic conduct in the first instance, including in questions
of timing”). The statute in question required the President to give early notice to Congress
before withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty. See id. at 1–2. Had the executive branch
complied with the statute, then withdrawal would have not been able to be effectuated until
the new presidential administration—a prospect that the Trump administration very much
wanted to avoid. In addition to an asserted exclusive presidential power over diplomacy, this
OLC opinion also rested on an asserted exclusive presidential power to execute treaties. See
id. at 2.

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

The Runaway Presidential Power over Diplomacy

113

does not wield these asserted powers, however, they will likely remain
dormant and available for a future administration.
II. THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLES OVER WHAT COUNTS
AS DIPLOMACY
Executive branch lawyers not only claim exclusive presidential powers
over diplomacy but also characterize “diplomacy” in sweeping terms.
They have “treated widely varied subject matters as falling within the
President’s exclusive authority over diplomacy” and consider the
“President’s authority over international negotiations as extending to any
subject that has bearing on the national interest.”93 They conceptualize
diplomacy to cover everything from policy formulation to the casting of
votes in international organizations. By defining diplomacy broadly for
constitutional purposes, executive branch lawyers vastly enlarge the reach
of the President’s assertedly exclusive powers over the content of U.S.
international engagement, the agents who undertake it, and information
related to it.
This broad constitutional conception of “diplomacy” is far from
inevitable. As this Part shows, there was no coherent meaning of
“diplomacy” at the time of the Framing. Indeed, the word “diplomacy”
was barely (if at all) an English word at the time of the Framing and, as
best I can tell, it was never used during the discourse over the
Constitution’s drafting and ratification. Instead, “[j]ust what [the
Framers] did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen
modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic
as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”94 It is far
from clear that the Framers wished the President to have exclusive power
over treaty negotiations. And it takes many further leaps of logic to
conclude, as the executive branch now does, that the Framers entrusted
the executive branch with exclusive control over U.S. negotiations that
are conducted by U.S. administrators rather than diplomats, involve
international regulatory coordination, and will never be brought to the
Senate for advice and consent.
This Part sets forth four ways in which our conception of “diplomacy”
could be cabined for purposes of any exclusive executive powers that can
93

OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 121–22 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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be derived from it. Each of these ways is a “road not taken” in executive
branch practice, with antecedents in constitutional history that have gone
unrealized. One way is structural: to limit presidential exclusivity related
to negotiations to the conduct of these negotiations rather than also
encompassing the formation of policy objectives on the front end or
certain international legal outcomes on the back end. A second way is
content-based: to define “diplomacy” as encompassing only particular
subject matters. A third way is institutional: to define diplomacy in terms
of diplomats rather than allowing exclusive presidential powers over
diplomacy to attach to any executive branch official engaged in
international discourse. A fourth way would focus on international
context and exclude U.S. participation in international organizations from
the reach of any exclusive presidential powers over diplomatic content,
agents, and information. I offer these four lost limits not as firm
prescriptions but rather as possibilities. My purpose in this Part is neither
to offer specific calls for rebalancing (a topic that I tentatively turn to in
Part III) nor to give an exhaustive historical accounting of these four
possible limits. Rather, it is to demonstrate that the executive branch’s
sweeping definition of “diplomacy” is neither constitutionally
predetermined nor conceptually mandated.
A. The Delphic Framing
The Constitution does not use any variant of the word “diplomacy.” At
the time of the Framing, the term barely existed in the English language.
The French terminology of a “corps diplomatique”—a cohort of envoys
and ministers—was known to and used by some of the Framers,95 and
“diplomat” eventually became an English word, likely after the
Founding.96 The word “diplomatic” referred originally to the authenticity
95
E.g., Letter from John Adams to Edmund Jenings (Sept. 16, 1782),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-13-02-0200
[https://perma.cc/LR9JJ7DJ] (“The Corps Diplomatique here, all Speak of the Independence of America as
decided. . . . I meet now the whole Corps Diplomatique, at Court, at the House of France and
that of Spain.”).
96
Dictionaries date its first use to 1813, but I have found one usage in the late 1790s.
Compare Diplomat, Oxford English Dictionary Online (2d ed. 1989),
https://www.oed.com/oed2/00064601 [https://perma.cc/4ZNS-ZTRJ] (identifying no usage
earlier than 1813), and Diplomat, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/diplomat [https://perma.cc/ZP6Y-EDBL] (also identifying 1813 as
the year of the first known use), with Letter from William Vans Murray to John Adams (July
1, 1798), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-2688 [https://perma.cc/
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of documents and, by the 1780s, was only beginning to develop a
connection to international relations.97 As for the word “diplomacy” itself,
dictionaries date its first uses of “diplomacy” to the mid-to-late eighteenth
century.98 “Diplomacy” is entirely absent from the twenty-nine volume

XRC8-4MP8] (observing challenges in Europe that arise for “a diplomat of strict honour”). I
thank the Virginia Law Review editors for search suggestions related to this and some other
terminology discussed in this paragraph.
97
Diplomatic,
Oxford
English
Dictionary
Online
(2d
ed.
1989)
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/53206?redirectedFrom=Diplomatic#eid
[https://perma.cc/3EMU-ZZPK] (dating the first use of “diplomatic” as it related to
international relations to the 1780s). During debates over the Constitution’s adoption, none of
the scant uses of “diplomatic” included in the multi-volume Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution involves a claim about powers exclusive to the president.
Author’s search conducted on https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/RNCN.html
[https://perma.cc/QE4D-3LLW] (producing only twenty uses of “diplomatic” after omitting
those usages added in the editorial notes). Of these twenty uses, many drew an explicit or
implicit distinction between the Congress under the Articles of Confederation, which served
as a “diplomatic” forum for conversations between states, and the new federal government
with its more robust powers. In the New York ratification debates, for example, Robert
Livingston specifically contrasted the role of a “mere diplomatic body, making engagements
for its respective States,” with a body that “was to enjoy legislative, judicial, and executive
powers.” 22 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification of
the Constitution by the States: New York 1687 (Kaminski et al. eds., 2008). Of the few usages
of “diplomatic” that referred to specific branches of the new government, two referred to one
or both branches of Congress, two described the Senate and President in combination, and
none referred to the President alone. See 27 The Documentary History of the Ratification of
the Constitution: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: South Carolina 102 (Kaminski
et al. eds., 2008) (in which Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, discussing the treaty-making power
during the South Carolina ratification debates, observed that “[t]he president and senate joined
were, therefore . . . deemed the most eligible corps in whom we could with safety vest the
diplomatic authority of the union”); id. at 119 (in which Pinckney made a similar statement);
id. at 340 (in which Pinckney stated “that the senate were a diplomatic body”); 17
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Commentaries on the
Constitution Public and Private 123 (Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (in which John Dickinson,
writing as Fabius, remarked that the “house of representatives . . . and the senate will actually
be not only legislative but also diplomatic bodies, perpetually engaged in the arduous task of
reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several sovereign states . . .”) (emphasis
omitted). The word “diplomatic” appears once in The Federalist, where Alexander Hamilton
used it in passing. The Federalist No. 81, at 601 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed.,
1864) (“Though consuls have not in strictness a diplomatic character, yet as they are the public
agents of the nations to which they belong . . . .”).
98
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary puts the first known usage in 1766. Diplomacy,
Merriam-Webster
Dictionary
Online,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/diplomacy [https://perma.cc/66BQ-XBHJ] (not identifying this
usage). The first usage identified by the Oxford English Dictionary occurred in Edmund
Burke’s 1796 writings on the French Revolution. Diplomacy, Oxford English Dictionary
Online (2d ed. 1989), https://www.oed.com/oed2/00064600 [https://perma.cc/33TX-9SDE].
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Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution,99 and its first
uses in the Corpus of Founding Era American English database occur in
the 1790s (mainly in connection to France).100 In other words, any time
we now talk about the constitutional power over “diplomacy,” we are
using a term that was not in the common lexicon of the Framers at the
time of the formation of the Constitution.
To the extent that the Framers had a comparable term, it was
“negotiate” and its variants like “negotiation.” These words were
sometimes used broadly, as when James Madison described the powers
of the federal government as “principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce.”101 Other times these words
were used to refer narrowly to bargaining with foreign nations over the
terms that would go in treaties. John Jay’s Federalist No. 64, for example,
focuses on the “negotiation of treaties.”102 He observes that the President
may need to gather intelligence from those who “would rely on the
secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in that of the senate”
and notes that, in pursuing negotiating objectives, “should any
circumstance occur, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate,
[the President] may at any time convene them.”103

99
A search for the word “diplomacy” in the twenty-nine volume Documentary History of
the Ratification of the Constitution returns zero results. Author’s search conducted on
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/RNCN.html [https://perma.cc/QGC4-CP6E].
100
A search for “diplomacy” in the Corpus of Founding Era American English database
returns eighteen uses (including some false positives and duplicates), of which most relate to
U.S.
relations
with
France.
Author’s
search
conducted
on
https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea/concordances/search [https://perma.cc/GTY7-FBNT]. The
earliest clear usage among these results comes from 1793, when affiliates of George
Washington use this term in translating a letter sent to Washington from the revolutionary
government of France. Letter from the Provisional Exec. Council of Fr. to George Washington
(Jan. 1793) (subsequent English translation done in the handwriting of Tobias Lear,
Washington’s
personal
secretary,
with
input
from
Thomas
Jefferson),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-12-02-0050
[https://perma.cc/FC8C-G899] (stating that “the Republic [of France] fervently desires to
strengthen bands too much neglected by the ancient diplomacy of the royal government”). By
contrast, a search for “negotiation” in the same database turns up more than 3,000 results.
Author’s search conducted on https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea/concordances/search
[https://perma.cc/TLM6-86ES].
101
The Federalist No. 45, at 363 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864).
102
The Federalist No. 64, at 485 (John Jay) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864).
103
Id. at 486. Dubiously, an OLC memorandum by William Barr reads Federalist No. 64 as
making it an “essential element of the Founders’ vision” that “the Constitution mandates
Presidential control over the disclosure of negotiations.” OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, supra
note 40, at 42. By contrast, a 2009 OLC memorandum (the most restrained in modern times)
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Whatever the terminology, the Constitution’s text does not establish
exclusive presidential power over what OLC now terms diplomacy. It
gives Congress extensive foreign affairs powers related to war and
commerce, makes the President Commander-in-Chief, provides that the
President will obtain the advice and consent of the Senate for treaties and
ambassadorial appointments, and authorizes the President to receive
ambassadors.104 Given the lack of specificity about diplomacy, it is no
surprise that textual claims by OLC to exclusive presidential diplomatic
powers tend to be short on analysis and big on conclusions. One 1990
OLC opinion by William Barr defends the President’s “broad authority
over the Nation’s diplomatic affairs” by citing generally to the first three
sections of Article II of the Constitution—without deigning to mention
the existence of Article I.105
Indeed, the written Constitution does not clearly give the President any
authority to disobey congressional statutes. Article II vests “[t]he
executive power” in the President and obligates the President to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”106 Recent scholarship argues
that cites to Federalist No. 64 describes the President only as having “significant discretion”
over negotiations. OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009, supra note 40, at 229.
For another example of a narrow use of negotiation from early constitutional practice, see
George Washington, Letter of Introduction Conferring Full Powers on John Jay (May 6,
1794), in 1 American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of
the United States 471 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1832) (authorizing Jay
to “agree, treat, consult, and negotiate” with British ministers and separately authorizing him
“to conclude and sign a treaty or treaties”).
104
See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2.
105
More specifically, the memorandum states:
The President possesses broad authority over the Nation’s diplomatic affairs. That
authority flows from his position as head of the unitary Executive and as Commander
in Chief. E.g., U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 2, & 3 . . . Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution also gives the President the specific authority to “appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls.” These constitutional provisions authorize the
President to determine the form and manner in which the United States will maintain
relations with foreign nations, and further to determine the individuals who will conduct
these relations.
OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, supra note 40, at 38 (concluding that therefore the statute at
issue is “clearly unconstitutional”). The impressive leaps in reasoning contained in this
paragraph are not further explained. In addition to not even mentioning Congress’s numerous
Article I powers related to foreign affairs, the memorandum neglects to note that the
appointment power is shared with the Senate. For another OLC opinion with reasoning that
closely tracks this one, see OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at 267. Other OLC
opinions do make passing mention to Congress’s Article I powers. E.g., OLC Opinion of June
1, 2009, supra note 40, at 225–26; OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 120.
106
U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
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that the Vesting Clause only gives the President the power to execute the
law107 and that historical evidence relating to the Take Care Clause puts
“a thumb on the scale in favor of the view that the President must carry
out federal statutes.”108 These accounts further unsettle any textually
grounded claims to exclusive presidential powers over diplomacy.
Early practice from the Framing Era is a similarly thin reed on which
to rest current executive branch assertions about exclusive diplomatic
powers. As discussed in the prior Part, this practice is not particularly
strong in establishing exclusive presidential power with respect to
content, agents, and information. Many of these precedents were more
about independent presidential powers than exclusive presidential
powers, such as early practice that established that the President did not
need to receive the advice and consent of the Senate prior to treaty
negotiation.109 And where exclusivity was implicated, its scope was
limited. Scattered indications that the President should have exclusive
control over treaty negotiations were tied to the knowledge that, prior to
ratification, the Senate would have a full opportunity to review the end
product of these negotiations in giving or withholding its advice and
consent.110 Early precedents in which the President withheld documents
from legislators reflected constitutional controversy rather than
consensus, occurred only in respect to one-House requests rather than in
107
See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1169, 1169 (2019) (arguing that “executive power” only
conveyed the power to execute laws). The Vesting Clause gets fairly light treatment in OLC
memoranda related to diplomacy, although it appears to be read capaciously in at least some
of them. E.g., OLC Opinion of Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 7 (asserting that “[e]xecutive
privilege is a ‘constitutionally based’ ‘corollary of the executive function vested in the
President by Article II of the Constitution,’ and it empowers the President to withhold
confidential information from the other Branches and the public when necessary to support
that function”). Other scholars have read the Vesting Clause as conferring more robust powers,
particularly in the foreign affairs context. See Prakash, supra note 16, at 188–89 (claiming that
the “executive power” included authority to “decide . . . what to say to” other countries).
Others have simply remarked on the indeterminacy of this Vesting Clause. As one scholar
wrote long ago, the Vesting Clause “was to prove a ‘joker’”—a wild card in the deck of clauses
that “admitted an interpretation of executive power which would give to the President a field
of action much wider than that outlined by the enumerated powers.” Charles C. Thach, The
Creation of the Presidency 1775–1789, at 138–39 (1922) (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins
University) (adding “[w]ith the correctness or incorrectness of this interpretation we are not
concerned”).
108
Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111, 2186 (2019).
109
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
110
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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response to legislated obligations, and came with clear recognition that
these chambers would be entitled to the documents under particular
conditions.111
More fundamentally, early practice involved a different vision of
international engagement than exists today. It was carried out through
treaties rather than ongoing conversations, framed by a sharp distinction
between foreign affairs and domestic ones, conducted by diplomats rather
than all kinds of governmental officials, and centered around private
bilateral negotiations without any formalized international organizations.
By taking contested claims of exclusive presidential power from this
setting and mapping it onto the wider world of modern “diplomacy,” the
executive branch has effectuated a vast shift of exclusive power to the
presidency.
B. Four Lost Limits on “Diplomacy”
The specific conversations between U.S. Presidents and their Russian
counterparts about arms control treaties are obviously within our
constitutional conception of diplomacy. But what about the policy
objectives pursued by U.S. Department of Treasury officials at an
international gathering of insurance regulators? The executive branch
thinks that this is also “diplomacy” for U.S. constitutional purposes,112
apparently on the assumption that any executive branch interactions with
foreign counterparts fall into this paradigm.
The executive branch’s sweeping view of “diplomacy” is not
constitutionally foreordained. In what follows, I suggest four narrower
ways that “diplomacy” could be conceptualized for constitutional
purposes. Each of these ways has antecedents in constitutional practice,
although some have stronger roots and would be more feasible to
implement than others.
1. Negotiating Process
In 1939, the British diplomat Harold Nicolson published a treatise titled
Diplomacy. He felt impelled, in that fateful year, to address the “the
mistake . . . in confusing policy with negotiation and in calling [both] by

111

See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
See generally DOJ Letter of Mar. 5, 2018, supra note 2 (asserting that a congressional
bill on this subject intruded on the president’s diplomatic powers).
112
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the same ill-favoured name of ‘Diplomacy.’”113 Instead, he explained,
policy should be considered the “‘legislative’ aspect” of diplomacy, while
negotiation was “its ‘executive’ aspect,” and different actors should have
final authority over each sphere.114
Drawing on this insight, one way to limit any exclusive presidential
powers over diplomacy would be to confine our constitutional conception
of diplomacy to negotiation rather than to policy. Under this approach,
Congress could, if it chose, establish U.S. foreign policy objectives and
review any substantive products of diplomacy before their finalization
(such as the signing of international agreements, the finalization of soft
law commitments, or the casting of votes in international organizations).
Exclusive presidential powers over diplomacy, if any, would be limited
to tactical decisions about how best to achieve these objectives in
negotiations. The President would retain the independent power to act
against a backdrop of congressional silence, but not the power to
disregard congressional mandates over policy objectives or ultimate
outputs. This approach could apply across the board with the possible
exception of the making of Article II treaties, where the President’s need
for the Senate’s advice and consent provides more than adequate
legislative oversight.
This approach builds on the Constitution’s structural commitment to
checks and balances. As noted earlier, it is an anachronism to map the
word “diplomacy” back onto the Framing, for “negotiation” is in fact the
proper term from that era. And the dominant vision from that time was
not unfettered presidential control over foreign policy. Rather it was one
of shared control between the President and the Senate. The President
would be responsible for “the management of foreign
negotiations . . . according to general principles concerted with the
Senate, and subject to their final concurrence.”115 The Senate was to have
both a role in setting negotiating objectives and the power to approve or
disapprove the product of negotiations—the treaty—before it took effect.
While the Senate’s role in setting negotiating objectives has ceased to be
an obligatory part of the treaty process, the Senate’s advice and consent
power continues to provide a major structural check on presidential power
for treaties brought to it.
113

Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy 12 (1939).
Id.
115
The Federalist No. 84, at 637 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864)
(emphasis added).
114
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But most “diplomacy” today is not about the negotiation of treaties that
will receive the advice and consent of the Senate—or even about the
negotiation of international agreements that will receive subsequent
congressional approval. Rather, it is about continuously ongoing
exchanges between U.S. executive branch officials and foreign
counterparts, sometimes mediated through international organizations
and often involving how the executive branch will use powers delegated
by Congress (like the power to impose sanctions). It would be unfeasible
and unworkable to expect Congress to approve all these exchanges. But,
for these exchanges, should Congress be able, if it chooses, to set
negotiating objectives or disapprove the making of a particular
international commitment or the casting of a particular international vote?
Under the approach now taken by the executive branch, Congress
cannot set negotiating objectives and only indirectly has power over
substantive results to the extent that these results depend for their
implementation on domestic law. These indirect powers are of course
significant. The content of existing federal laws (and the possibility of
changes to these laws) will inevitably influence the stances taken by
executive branch officials, and these officials may also take to heart the
views of individual, influential members of the House or Senate. But
influence is different from ultimate control, and the approach taken by the
executive branch treats ultimate control over both policy and negotiation
as squarely with the President. By contrast, recognizing that Congress has
the ultimate power to assert control over U.S. foreign policy objectives
and over eventual outputs is more consistent with the broader
constitutional premise of legislative oversight.
The concept of congressional control over policy objectives has
antecedents in historical practice. As mentioned earlier, Daniel Webster
took this position in the 1820s in debates over whether to appropriate
money to send a U.S. diplomat to an international conference—an event
that was a forerunner to modern multilateral engagement.116 As one
Senator put it almost a century later, one can “agree . . . that the President
has the exclusive right of the conduct of our foreign relations, conducting
diplomatic intercourse, and negotiating treaties; but there is a grave
difference . . . between the President’s right to conduct our foreign
relations and the question of what our foreign policy shall be.”117 And
116

See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
64 Cong. Rec. 1219 (1923) (statement of Sen. Brandegee) (adding that “I never have
thought, and do not now think, that the President has a right, of his own motion, to decide
117

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

122

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:81

especially with trade, but with other matters as well, congressional
statutes have long specified the “policy of the United States” with respect
to matters of foreign affairs—even if executive branch officials have not
always honored these principles.118 This approach would parallel the
boundary that some have drawn between Congress’s war powers and any
exclusive powers held by the President as the Commander-in-Chief—a
boundary in which Congress has overall control but the president has
certain exclusive tactical powers on the battleground.119
An approach that limited the President’s exclusive constitutional power
over diplomacy to negotiation rather than to policy formation would
continue to leave the President with vast control. The President’s role in
the legislative process is a powerful tool for resisting the inclusion of
congressional mandates into statutes in the first place, and control over
the negotiating process would vest the executive branch with considerable
discretion. Moreover, the lines between negotiating objectives, the actual
negotiations, and the outputs of negotiations are not easy to draw. A
statutory requirement that executive branch officials wait several months
to finalize an agreement (or to give notice of a withdrawal from an
agreement) would seem clearly within Congress’s power under this
approach, as this provision would be designed to give Congress an
opportunity for review substantive outcomes.120 But what about a
congressional statute mandating that particular negotiations begin within
a year? Would that be permissible as policy on the part of Congress or
impermissible as negotiation? Yet though blurry and limited in its effect,
what the foreign policy of the United States of America shall be and to go ahead and put it in
operation in spite of the wish[es] of the Congress or of the people of the country”).
118
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
119
For a discussion and critique of the assumption that the President has certain exclusive
constitutional powers over tactics on the battleground, see David J. Barron & Martin S.
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and
Original Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (2008); David J. Barron & Martin S.
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 Harv.
L. Rev. 941 (2008).
120
Congress has recognized indirect powers in these areas—for example, if the executive
branch negotiates an international commitment in which it agrees to use delegated discretion
to waive congressionally-imposed sanctions, Congress can remove the underlying executive
branch discretion. Cf. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–17 at § 2,
129 Stat. 201, 203 (providing that the President could not waive sanctions on Iran during a
specified time period (thirty or sixty days, depending on the start date) after the finalized
agreement had been provided to Congress). Although this is an important authority, it is
different from the power to mandate that the executive branch wait to finalize an international
commitment in the first place.
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drawing lines between policy, negotiation, and outputs for constitutional
purposes would nonetheless empower Congress in comparison to the
sweeping vision of exclusive executive control over diplomacy now
asserted by the executive branch.
2. Subject Matter
At the time of the Framing, when the word diplomacy did not exist,
negotiations between nations centered mainly around war, peace, trade,
alliance, and treatment of foreign nationals. Now nations interact not only
around these topics, but also around almost everything else: health, crime,
individual rights, tax, finance, migration, investment, labor, intellectual
property, and the environment.121
Executive branch lawyers today consider all these interactions to fall
under the umbrella of “diplomacy”—and therefore to fall with exclusive
executive control. The overall effect is a vast accrual of structural power
for the Presidency, even if we assume (dubiously) that the full bundle of
diplomatic powers described earlier did in fact belong exclusively to the
President at the time of the Framing. Because diplomacy now
encompasses so much more than it once did, the President’s control over
diplomacy is a far more significant power.
Historical practice holds hints of narrower ways to define “diplomacy”
for constitutional purposes. Taking stock of the constitutional separation
of powers with respect to diplomacy in a 1926 article in the American
Journal of International Law, Henry Wriston noted a distinction between
international conferences of a “political or diplomatic character” and
those of a “technical and scientific character.”122 Wriston focused in
particular on a 1913 statute requiring that “the Executive shall not extend
or accept any invitation to participate in any international congress,
121
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 5 (2004) (explaining that nations now
“relate to each other not only through the Foreign Office, but also through
regulatory . . . channels”).
122
Wriston, supra note 57 at 35, 40, 41, 44 (suggesting that the executive branch has been
more willing to ignore congressional restrictions with respect to international conferences
“manifestly diplomatic and political in character” but less so with respect to “conferences of
less important character”). For a view along these lines expressed by a former Supreme Court
Justice, see Abe Fortas, Comments on The Presidency as I Have Seen It, in Emmet John
Hughes, The Living Presidency 309, 336 (1972) (noting “the distinction between
international-political and international-economic affairs” and concluding that “Congress
should have and exercise greater direction over international-economic affairs . . . despite the
obvious difficulty in separating economic and political affairs”).
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conference, or like event, without first having specific authority of law to
do so.”123 Wriston considered this statute a “legislative trespass on
historic executive functions” and approved of the executive branch’s
approach of largely ignoring this statute, claiming that “there was already
ample provision for preventing the President from entering upon binding
commitments at conferences.”124 Yet he observed that the executive
branch has complied with the statute for some “conferences of less
important character” like an international conference on education,
although it had “acted with considerable boldness” in disregarding the
statute for conferences that were “manifestly diplomatic and political in
character” like the Paris Peace Conference.125
As suggested by Wriston’s reasoning and the practice he describes, we
could envision “diplomacy” very differently from how the executive
branch treats it today. The early “technical and scientific” conferences
mentioned by Wriston can be seen as forerunners for international
standard-setting and international regulatory cooperation. Such activity is
less about ordering the public relations between nations and more about
coordination among nations in order to regulate their own subjects. It is
an example of how the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs
has faded in our increasingly interconnected world.
It is possible to envision a constitutional concept of “diplomacy”
centered around matters that are “political” rather than “technical” in
nature. Yet of the four lost limits on diplomacy identified here, this one is
the most understandably lost. In the context of what issues can be fit
subjects for Article II treaties, historical practice has recognized that
subject matter limits are inappropriate. While a treaty cannot “authorize
what the Constitution forbids . . . it is not perceived that there is any limit
to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is
properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”126 The
challenge of drawing lines based on subject matter is substantial—harder
in many ways than drawing lines based on processes or institutions.
123

Act of Mar. 4, 1913, Pub. L. No. 62–434, 37 Stat. 912, 913 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262).
Wriston, supra note 57, at 45 (stating that Congress could withhold an appropriation if it
were needed for a particular conference, that the Senate would have to advise and consent to
any treaty arising from this conference, and that for “informal engagements . . . there would
be need, not infrequently, for legislation to carry into effect [the] contemplated action”).
Notably, these constraints are less applicable under the modern structure of international
engagement.
125
Id. at 40, 44.
126
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
124
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3. Agencies
A third way to limit our constitutional concept of “diplomacy” would
be to tie it to certain institutional actors within the executive branch.
Under this approach, any exclusive presidential powers over diplomatic
content, agents, and information could be exercised by the President or
agencies devoted primarily to the conduct of foreign affairs, but Congress
would retain control over other agencies. In other words, the President’s
exclusive powers over diplomacy could be tied to their exercise by
diplomats.
In 1789, when Congress established the initial Cabinet offices, it used
quite different language in setting forth the duties of these offices. For the
Treasury Department, Congress provided that “there shall be a
Department of Treasury,” established the position of Secretary of the
Treasury, and set forth a list of specific duties for that Secretary (such as
“to prepare and report estimates of the public revenue, and the public
expenditures” and “to superintend the collection of the revenue”).127 But
for the State Department—initially called the Department of Foreign
Affairs—Congress used quite different language, declining to give
marching orders and instead emphasizing presidential control. Congress
provided that “there shall be an Executive department, to be denominated
the Department of Foreign Affairs,” that it should have a Secretary, and
that this Secretary “shall perform and execute such duties as shall from
time to time be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the
United States . . . relative to . . . matters respecting foreign affairs, as the
President of the United States shall assign to the said department.”128 It
added for good measure that “the said principal officer shall conduct the
business of the said department in such manner as the President of the
United States shall from time to time order or instruct.”129
This approach to the State Department was befitting to the era of the
corps diplomatique. Thomas Jefferson’s claim in 1790 that the
“transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether”130
127
Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 7, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 65, 66; see also id. § 8 (setting limits on who
could hold the office, including that the person not be the “owner in whole or in part of any
sea-vessel”).
128
Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28–29.
129
Id. § 1.
130
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion Given on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic
Appointments of Apr. 24, 1790, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-16-020215 [https://perma.cc/MQL7-PPE8] (arguing against legislative determinations of
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was with reference to transactions involving encounters between
ambassadors and other public ministers who followed a set of formal
practices established by international law and custom. The era of domestic
regulators talking to foreign regulators was mostly nascent—and to the
extent it existed, we have no clear indications that Jefferson’s vision of
executive power was meant to apply to it. As noted earlier, in 1794,
Congress specified that “the Postmaster General may make arrangements
with the postmasters in any foreign country for the reciprocal receipt and
delivery of letters and packets.”131 This language—unobjected to as far as
I can tell by the executive branch guardians of executive control over
negotiation—seems to recognize the prospect of domestic agencies
interacting through regulatory channels rather than the corps
diplomatique in ways that were appropriate for congressional
authorization.
As U.S. domestic agencies beyond the State Department have come
more and more to engage abroad, does their engagement partake of any
exclusive presidential powers over diplomacy, or is it instead subject to
congressional control to the same extent as on domestic matters? Henry
Wriston’s article from 1926 took it as a given that Congress could
exercise more control over agencies (even including the State
Department) than over the President. He rooted his objections to the 1913
congressional statute requiring specific authorization for attendance at
international conferences in the fact that this law applied to the President
rather than to a particular agency. He emphasized that Congress can
indeed “giv[e] directions or powers, or limit[] the authority of federal
bureaus.”132
While OLC now takes the position that the president’s diplomatic
powers apply to agencies as they engage abroad,133 this claim fits uneasily
both with traditional congressional authority over agencies and with
aspects of historical practice. Over the years, Congress has legislated in
ways aimed at controlling the process by which agencies engage abroad.
diplomatic grades); cf. Wriston, supra note 57, at 33–34 (noting how Congress nonetheless
came to determine diplomatic grades over the nineteenth century).
131
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239.
132
Wriston, supra note 57, at 39 n.27 (adding that “[s]uch an authorization is proper when
directed to a bureau, but to require the President to get such authorization to engage in a
discussion, for such is the work of a conference, is an entirely different matter”). OLC cites to
the Wriston article as supporting presidential power over diplomacy, understood broadly,
without ever mentioning this caveat. OLC Opinion of June 1, 2009, supra note 40, at 230–31.
133
E.g., DOJ Letter of Mar. 5, 2018, supra note 2, at 2.
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One notable example—the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act—requires that “an
international agreement may not be signed or otherwise concluded on
behalf of the United States without prior consultation with the Secretary
of State.”134 This statute bars agencies from making international
commitments without the sign-off of the State Department, thus
structuring the process of international engagement by the agencies of the
executive branch. Kristina Daugirdas’s work demonstrates the long
history of congressional control over Department of Treasury
participation in organizations like the World Bank.135 And in at least one
instance, Congress has mandated that a particular agency use notice-andcomment procedures with respect to international negotiations.136
OLC has not only failed to grapple with these precedents but also with
the logic of its position with respect to independent agencies, which are
subject to only light presidential control via appointments. These agencies
can engage internationally without being particularly accountable to the
President.137 In a 1984 case—one litigated before the executive branch
became hyper-aggressive about asserting exclusive diplomatic powers—
the Supreme Court seemed to assume that Congress could exercise
control over commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission
as they engaged in international exchanges.138
It is easier to define “diplomacy” for constitutional purposes in terms
of institutional structure than in terms of subject matter. Where it is

134
1 U.S.C. § 112b(c) (adding that “[s]uch consultation may encompass a class of
agreements rather than a particular agreement”). As far as I know, the executive branch has
not publicly challenged the constitutionality of this provision, which was passed at a time
when the executive branch was considerably more accepting of Congress’s constitutional
authority to intervene with respect to international engagement. The logic of recent executive
branch reasoning would suggest, however, that OLC would likely view this provision as
unconstitutional today, and it is unclear how extensively it is complied with in practice.
135
See Daugirdas, supra note 6, at 519–20.
136
See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing this example).
137
See generally Conti-Brown & Zaring, supra note 21 (discussing how the Federal Reserve
engages abroad). This circle can maybe be squared by arguing that Congress can control these
independent agencies abroad because the agencies are only representing themselves, and not
the United States writ large. But that same logic could potentially be applied to executive
branch agencies as well.
138
FCC v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. 463 (1984), held as a matter of statutory
interpretation that the disclosure requirements of the Sunshine Act did not apply to several
commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) while they were
attending a transatlantic conference of communications regulators. Nothing in the Court’s
unanimous opinion suggested that Congress would have lacked the power to apply the
Sunshine Act to FCC commissioners abroad. See id. at 472–74.
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difficult to distinguish between “political” and “technical” subject
matters, it is relatively easy to distinguish between the Department of
State and the Department of the Treasury. Under this institutional
approach, Congress could keep nondiplomatic agencies from the
negotiating table, set the terms under which they participate, or require
them to share information with Congress to the same extent that Congress
may exercise this control as a matter of domestic administrative law.
(What this extent is as a matter of domestic law is a disputed issue, and
one that I do not take up in this Article.139) Under this approach, Congress
would be within its rights to ban the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy from conducting bilateral negotiations with China to
the same extent that it could exercise similar control on a matter of
domestic administrative law—contrary to OLC’s view that such a ban is
unconstitutional.140 As Zachary Price has put it, “Congress
should . . . hold broad authority to limit use of nondiplomatic government
personnel for diplomatic purposes.”141 Congress might choose to be chary
in imposing limits or restrictions on how domestic agencies interact
abroad, given the added usefulness of flexibility in international
engagement, and it might be appropriate to give heightened deference to
agencies with respect to this engagement.142 But this does not mean that
Congress’s traditional right of control over domestic-facing agencies
must vanish when they look outward.

139
For the broader debate on the scope of congressional control over administrative agencies
as distinct from unitary executive power of the president, see generally Peter L. Strauss,
Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
696 (2007); cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2235 n.9
(2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (suggesting with respect to the removal power that the
President’s prerogatives should be particularly strong with respect to “close military or
diplomatic advisers”).
140
OLC Opinion of Sept. 19, 2011, supra note 2, at 119 (finding this restriction
unconstitutional). The Office of Science and Technology Policy is an office established by
Congress in 1976; its Director is charged with providing “advice on the scientific, engineering,
and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest levels of Government.”
Presidential Science and Technology Advisory Organization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-282,
§ 204(a), 90 Stat. 459, 463. While these issues could include matters of “national security”
and “foreign relations”, the Director’s statutory role is to advise the President rather than to
serve as a diplomat. See id. at § 204(b).
141
Price, supra note 6, at 461.
142
See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 Cornell L.
Rev. 735, 742 (2014) (arguing that practical needs for increased flexibility support
acknowledgment of more independent presidential powers, heightened delegations and
deference, and a relaxation of some procedural requirements).
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4. International Organizations
Participation in international organizations is a major form of U.S.
international engagement today—one that was unforeseen by the
Framers. This engagement is typically derivative either of a treaty that
received the Senate’s advice and consent or of an international agreement
that received Congressional authorization. U.S. engagement in the United
Nations is an example of the former; U.S. engagement in the World
Health Organization is an example of the latter.143
For the executive branch today, such engagement is part and parcel of
the proclaimed exclusive executive powers over diplomacy. The
executive branch asserts the power not only to determine the positions for
which the United States advocates within these international
organizations, but also how the United States engages in acts with formal
international legal significance, like the casting of votes.
This view overlooks past practice that treated U.S. engagement in
international organizations as different from traditional bilateral
diplomacy for purposes of constitutional law. The United States’ joining
of the United Nations was originally seen as a transformative commitment
that would rework the separation of foreign affairs powers in practice.144
Edward Corwin described the implementing legislation as setting forth a
“controlling theory” that “American participation in [the] United Nations
shall rest on the principle of departmental collaboration, and not on an
exclusive presidential prerogative in the diplomatic field.”145 Indeed, as
143

See 91 Cong. Rec. 8189–90 (1945) (containing the Senate’s advice and consent to the
U.N. Charter); S.J. Res. 98, ch. 469, 62 Stat. 441 (1948) (containing congressional
authorization for U.S. entry into the World Health Organization).
144
This was true not just with respect to international engagement, but with respect to other
foreign affairs powers as well. With respect to international agreements and uses of force, the
executive branch gained and has since retained independent powers from the post-World War
II moment, even as it seeks to walk back any concessions with respect to what it terms
“diplomacy.” For an account of how the executive branch gained power to bypass the Article
II treaty process, see generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995) (describing the shift away from Article II treaties to ex post
congressional executive agreements in the post-World War II era). For an account of this era’s
influence on the constitutional distribution of war powers, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jean
Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic: International Law, Domestic
Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 689, 733–36 (2016) (noting how
presidents relied on the U.N. Charter in bolstering claims to their concurrent war powers).
145
Corwin, supra note 17, at 221–22 (deeming such collaboration a “sound constitutional
principle in that it can claim a great deal of support from the history of the conduct of American
foreign relations, especially in the period prior to the war with Mexico” and also “the only
practicable principle unless we wish to establish outright presidential dictatorship”).
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noted earlier, in 1947 Congress legislated that the United States should
not cast a veto in the Security Council if a particular issue came before it,
with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the executive branch.146
A few years later, a House committee made a point similar to Corwin’s
in a report regarding U.S. funding for international organizations. The
report stated:
The field of negotiation involved in the determining of the course
and scope of operations in international organizations in which this
Nation participates is distinguishable from [other forms of international
relations] . . . It should be kept in mind that United States participation
in such organizations arises not from inherent Executive powers under
the Constitution but is in pursuance to laws enacted by the Congress.
The Executive cannot bind the Nation in this field, because
contributions to international organizations involve the power of the
purse, and that power belongs to Congress.147

In now asserting that U.S. participation in international organizations
is a manifestation of the president’s exclusive powers over diplomacy,
executive branch lawyers ignore the ways in which congressional
authorization is woven into U.S. participation in international
organizations. When the executive branch casts a vote in the World Bank
to fund a loan to a particular country, it does so only because Congress
has approved U.S. participation in the World Bank and funds U.S.
contributions to it. When the executive branch votes in the U.N. Security
Council in favor of the imposition of sanctions on a particular country, it
does so because the Senate advised and consented to the U.N. Charter and
because Congress has given the executive branch the pre-existing
authority to impose these sanctions. It would be relatively easy to
conclude that the price of these authorizations is acceptance of
congressional mandates—especially given the executive branch’s
extensive suite of tools for keeping such mandates to a minimum. Instead,
the executive branch has embraced the enlargement of “diplomacy” while
rejecting any direct limits on presidential control thereof.

146

See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 81st Cong., Rep. on Amendment of Certain Laws Providing
for Membership and Participation by the U.S. in Certain Int’l Orgs. 7 (Confidential Comm.
Print 1949).
147
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III. RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OVER
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
The executive branch presently takes an all-or-nothing approach to the
allocation of the diplomatic powers—all for the President and nothing for
Congress. Up to this point, this Article has critiqued the constitutional
foundations of this approach (as it applies to power over content, agents,
and information) and challenged how the executive branch defines
diplomacy for constitutional purposes. In this Part, I turn from the past to
the future and ask how constitutional control over international
engagement could best be conceptualized and operationalized going
forward.
I begin by setting out three doctrinal options: the complete control now
claimed by the executive branch, a converse framework in which
Congress would have the ultimate say, and an intermediate approach
which would narrow but not entirely abandon exclusive presidential
powers with respect to international engagement. I argue in favor of the
third option, though recognizing that it has its flaws and will leave much
unsettled. I then discuss institutional pathways by which Congress might
pursue this option and strengthen its constitutional hand. I close by
considering some lessons that my study of the diplomatic powers holds
for broader scholarship and practice regarding the separation of powers.
A. Doctrinal Options for the Distribution of Powers
Broadly speaking, three doctrinal approaches are plausible for the
distribution of power respecting how the United States engages
internationally with its counterparts. The first approach is the one
championed by the executive branch, in which the President has exclusive
control over diplomacy—and diplomacy is understood capaciously. The
second approach is one in which Congress would have ultimate control
across the board, obligating the President to carry out any congressional
mandates except perhaps those that would remove presidential power
over representation. The third approach would draw fine-grained lines,
recognizing some space for exclusive executive power but defining this
space far more narrowly than OLC does at present.
The first approach—the maximalist OLC approach—does have certain
advantages. I have criticized it throughout this Article as based on shoddy
constitutional reasoning: it overlooks the Framers’ assumption that the
products of negotiations would need to receive Senate advice and consent,
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it misreads some historical precedents, it ignores other historical
precedents, and it fails to grapple with the radically different landscape of
foreign policy in the modern era. But this approach is relatively easy to
administer and it will produce desirable policy results at times and
perhaps on average. The President’s policy judgments may often be better
than Congress’s in the first place. Moreover, the President will have more
flexibility to adjust to changing situations if not bound by statutory
constraints.
Nonetheless, this approach should be a source of considerable concern,
and not only for those who are wary of legal overclaiming. It should alarm
those who believe, as a matter of principle, that the President should
answer to Congress or, as a matter of experience, that the risks of a horrific
President make it valuable for Congress to be able to impose constraints.
This is particularly true as claims over exclusive diplomatic powers are
being drawn upon to justify not just talk, but also actions with
international legal significance. The Trump administration’s decision that
it could withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty in a
manner that conflicted with a congressional mandate is an example of the
importance of the distribution of diplomatic powers in practice.148
The second approach—ultimate control to Congress—also has much
to recommend it. It has strong claims as an originalist matter (power over
representation excepted), it is faithful to the broader constitutional
presumption in favor of congressional control, and it sets up a clear,
bright-line rule. The President’s role in the legislative process gives the
executive branch a tool for resisting the passage of undesirable legislation.
And if we are moving, as we seem to be, to a practice whereby presidents
energetically repudiate many major foreign policy decisions of their
opposite-party predecessors, then a presidential obligation to obey
congressional mandates regarding diplomacy could provide useful
ballast.
A regime of pure congressional control would nonetheless rest uneasily
with considerable constitutional practice. The history of the diplomatic
powers is marked not by unmitigated congressional control, but rather by
a longstanding constitutional tussle between the political branches. This
Article has emphasized the presence of practice favoring Congress, but
there is no shortage of practice favoring the executive branch as well, and
some of it dates well before the OLC echo chamber of the last thirty years.
148

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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There are legitimate functional concerns about how micro-management
by Congress might hinder U.S. foreign policy. To give one example:
should the executive branch need a special authorization from Congress
to attend any international conference, as required by the 1913 statute that
remains on the books?149
Moreover, any conclusion that the President has no exclusive
diplomatic powers other than representation will have to grapple with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Zivotofsky. Even if the Supreme Court got
this decision wrong, it is unlikely to reverse itself in the near future. One
could just treat Zivotofsky as about recognition and nothing more, and the
Court certainly does emphasize the narrowness of its holding.150 But
Zivotofsky also suggests that the President has at least some other
exclusive diplomatic powers, although clearly indicating that these
powers are less than those claimed by the executive branch.151
The third approach—an intermediate path—would build upon the
complexity described in this Article. Such an approach would give
Congress more power than the executive branch considers Congress to
have, but it would accept that the President does have certain exclusive
powers related to diplomacy. It would treat Zivotofsky as established
doctrine with respect to the recognition power, acknowledging that the
outcome in Zivotofsky was defensible (though not foreordained) as a
matter of constitutional reasoning and deeming the Court unlikely to
revisit this issue. For the rest, it would draw on Zivotofsky’s reminder that
“[i]n a world that is ever more compressed and interdependent, it is
essential the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and
respected.”152
What would such an intermediate path look like? There is no single
obvious answer and, for whatever path is chosen, implementation will be
harder than for either of the other two paths because it eschews their bright
line rules of always letting one branch win.
I think the most promising approach would narrow our constitutional
concept of “diplomacy” for purposes of exclusive presidential power in
two of the four ways identified earlier. First, we could limit our
constitutional concept of “diplomacy” to the negotiating process, rather
than including the formation of policy objectives and outcomes like the
149

22 U.S.C. § 262.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 20 (2015).
151
Id. at 20–21.
152
Id. at 21.
150
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casting of votes. Such a limit would give Congress the option of exerting
control over inputs and outputs, while shielding the executive branch from
the risk of micro-management along the way. This option of
congressional control would be available in all situations except where
either the President is negotiating a treaty that will be sent to the Senate
for advice and consent (in which case, the requirement of subsequent
Senate review serves as a powerful check on presidential over-reaching)
or where the President is negotiating over issues that lie within
presidential exclusive power as a matter of substance (such as recognition
or the exercise of whatever slice of authority is exclusively given to the
commander-in-chief). Second, we could confine “diplomacy” for
purposes of exclusive presidential powers to the President and agencies
designed to focus primarily on foreign affairs, allowing Congress to
control nondiplomatic agencies as they engage abroad similarly to how
Congress can control them as a matter of domestic law. While it is
functionally useful for agencies to have extra flexibility when they engage
abroad—and potentially to partake in part of the President’s concurrent
(as distinct from exclusive) authority over foreign affairs—both historical
practice and structural constitutional principles support ultimate control
being vested with Congress.
As discussed earlier, both these limits have plausible pedigrees.153
Bringing these limits into our constitutional concept of “diplomacy”
would sharply narrow the scope of exclusive presidential power over
international engagement by circumscribing the executive branch’s
definitions of diplomatic content, agents, and information.
With respect to content, Congress could assert the same level of control
over nondiplomatic agencies engaging internationally as it does over
these agencies in other settings. As to the President (and diplomatic agents
acting under the President), Congress could exert overall control over
policy objectives and over the end products of negotiations, while leaving
the President with exclusive power over the bargaining process itself. This
would be similar to the exclusive power the President may have as

153

See supra Section II.B. I propose using only these two limits, and not the other two
potential limits identified earlier. Defining “diplomacy” narrowly in terms of subject matter
has only light support as a limiting factor as a matter of constitutional history and, perhaps
relatedly, seems more challenging to implement in practice than does defining “diplomacy”
in terms of institutional actors. As for international organizations, the other two limiting
factors proposed would operate in practice to give Congress increased control over U.S.
decision making within these organizations.
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commander-in-chief to make tactical decisions on the battlefield. This
approach would allow Congress to identify “the policy of the United
States” without objection (a phrase that has symbolic power even though
it may not give rise to binding obligations), instruct the President to
pursue certain substantive outcomes through negotiations, mandate how
the United States votes in international organizations, and delay or block
the executive branch from joining international agreements. The
President would have exclusive discretion, within the bounds of good
faith, to decide with whom to negotiate, how to time the negotiations, and
which words or tactics to employ. Control over the bargaining process
would leave the President with considerable practical authority to thwart
new developments that the President does not support, even apart from
the power to veto legislation setting out policy objectives in the first
place.154 Moreover, this approach would empower Congress to slow or
block sharp swings in U.S. foreign policy.
Turning to agents, Congress could control how nondiplomatic agencies
engage abroad to the same extent that it can control these agencies in
domestic settings. For engagement to count as “diplomacy” for
constitutional purposes—and thus to trigger exclusive presidential
power—it would have to run through the President or agencies that focus
primarily on foreign affairs. In other words, the diplomatic powers would
run to those who are most clearly the institutional heirs of the corps
diplomatique. And even with respect to those heirs, we might also
acknowledge some increased congressional control. As a seven-Justice
majority of the Supreme Court observed in June 2020, the advice-andconsent requirement in the Appointments Clause was designed to
“provide an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President
and a guard against the appointment of unfit characters.”155 Yet even as
154

Control over policy and end products would also suggest that Congress should be able
to set spending restrictions on foreign aid, see Price, supra note 6, at 454–55 (discussing this
issue), place time limits or bans on the entry into force of executive agreements, and
potentially place time limits or bans on unilateral presidential treaty withdrawals. Cf. Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–17, § 2, 129 Stat. 201, 203 (providing
that the President could not waive sanctions on Iran during a specified time period—thirty or
sixty days, depending on the start date—after the finalized agreement had been provided to
Congress). On those limited matters where the issues under negotiation are ones over which
the President has exclusive control—such as recognition or whatever exclusive powers come
with the commander-in-chief role—the President would necessarily have exclusive control
over the policy objectives and outputs of negotiation.
155
Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv. LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1657 (2020)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
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international engagement has become far more productive of end
products that do not require approval from Congress, the executive branch
has claimed that the President has exclusive power to conduct it through
whomever the President selects, whether confirmed or unconfirmed.
Ryan Scoville signals support for a “revitalized Appointments
Clause . . . as one useful mechanism” for containing “the executive and
restor[ing] the separation of powers.”156 The use of special envoys
available to the President could be left in place except to the extent that
Congress has mandated otherwise. Similarly, Congress could retain
considerable ability to structure the offices even of diplomats, as it did
through the U.N. Participation Act.157
Control over information would follow a similar path. Where
administrative agencies are negotiating about their exercises of delegated
powers, Congress should be able to mandate oversight through statutory
reporting requirements to the same extent that they can mandate oversight
on domestic issues.158 For negotiations conducted by the President or
diplomatic proxies, the President could have a narrow privilege to
withhold documents related to the negotiations if the President deemed
the public interest to require it. This approach would track the reasonable
balance that was struck in practice prior to the Trump administration,159
156

Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, supra note 6, at 1002.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
158
Under this reasoning, the Trump administration should not have been able to invoke a
privilege over diplomatic information in withholding a memorandum written by the Secretary
of Commerce regarding potential tariffs that a statute obligated it to disclose. OLC Opinion of
Jan. 17, 2020, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11–14 (also offering several other reasons for withholding
the memorandum); cf. Cause Action Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 513 F. Supp. 116, 130
(D.D.C. 2021) (holding that this memorandum could not be disclosed pursuant to FOIA in
light of presidential communicative privilege, notwithstanding the various statutes mandating
that it be made public). It might of course be the case that such requirements could damage
U.S. negotiating interests. But this seems like an interest that Congress itself can weigh in
deciding whether to attach reporting requirements to statutory delegations—especially in light
of Congress’s strong countervailing interests in oversight. The Biden administration
ultimately released this memorandum in the summer of 2021, although apparently without
comment as to whether it had a legal obligation to do so. See Doug Palmer, Commerce
Releases Trump-Era Report Justifying Auto Tariffs on National Security Grounds, Politico
(July 7, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/07/commerce-trump-era-report-autotariffs-498531 [https://perma.cc/3V8E-7EJW].
159
In the 1996 controversy related to Mexico’s debt crisis, for example, the Clinton
administration disclosed numerous documents and only withheld ones that related specifically
to the White House (as distinct from agencies), including “confidential communications
between the President and foreign leaders.” OLC Opinion of June 28, 1996, supra note 45, at
259 (also noting the withholding of White House documents “revealing White House
157
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consistent with what the Supreme Court has called a “tradition of
negotiation and compromise” with respect to congressional subpoenas in
general.160 It should be applicable except in impeachment proceedings,
where the House and the Senate should be entitled to whatever
information they need to determine whether “Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors” have been committed.161
The proposed redistribution of the powers offered here would probably
not radically reshape U.S. international engagement in practice. As this
Article has shown, Congress often passes statutory provisions with
mandates regarding international engagement—but as frequent as these
provisions are, they still address only a fraction of what is done by the
executive branch. Moreover, if the executive branch came to recognize
these provisions as constitutionally valid, it might exert more political
effort during the bill-drafting process to keep them from becoming law or
to demand the inclusion of sunset clauses in order to preserve future
flexibility. Filibuster reform, should it ever occur, would make it easier
for the executive branch to seek removal of statutory obligations that it
views as too constraining. Finally, treating domestic-facing agencies as
controllable by Congress in their international engagement to the same
extent that they are controllable by Congress in domestic engagement
would still leave significant space for executive branch officials to push
back against Congress. These officials could do so through general
constitutional argumentation with respect to agents (based on variants of
the unitary executive theory) and with respect to information (based on
claims of executive privilege). The executive branch could also
potentially shift certain negotiations from the hands of domestic-facing
agencies to traditionally diplomatic ones to strengthen its constitutional

deliberations” and CIA documents “that constituted daily briefings for the President or records
of meetings at the National Security Council or with senior White House staff”).
160
Trump v. Mazars USA, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020). In the parallel national security
context, Congress and the executive branch reached a statutory compromise whereby the
President ordinarily reports covert actions in advance to key congressional committees or their
leaders but can delay this reporting in exceptional situations. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(1)–(3).
161
U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. Recognition of this principle goes back to George Washington
and the Jay Treaty. Jean Galbraith & Michel Paradis, George Washington’s Advisors Agreed:
Impeachment Did Away with Executive Privilege, Just Security (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/66713/george-washingtons-advisors-agreed-impeachment-didaway-with-executive-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/6MNR-2HM2] (noting agreement among
Washington’s advisors that the papers related to the Jay Treaty would need to be disclosed if
the House of Representatives had been pursuing an impeachment proceeding).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

138

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:81

hand, although such gamesmanship would be unlikely to be worth the
bureaucratic hassle for many matters of negotiation.
Yet although the total effect of the doctrinal shifts proposed here would
likely be modest relative to the total mass of U.S. foreign policy, it would
be significant in establishing available checks on presidential power. For
unless we draw some lines—even partially unsatisfactory ones—through
the morass of U.S. international engagements, presidents are likely over
time to define “diplomacy” for purposes of exclusive presidential power
in broader and broader terms. With respect to content, the approach
proposed here would enable Congress to have ultimate control of certain
actions (such as votes in international organizations). This ultimate
control is particularly important as the executive branch is increasingly
reading the President’s asserted exclusive constitutional powers over
diplomacy to cover actions like votes or treaty withdrawals. With respect
to agents, the approach proposed here would enable Congress to increase
executive branch accountability by structuring who within the executive
branch carries out various responsibilities, especially with respect to the
activities of nondiplomats and the exercise of delegated powers. With
respect to information, this approach would ensure Congress’s powers of
oversight even against a president who rejected traditional norms of
cooperation. In other words, the doctrinal shifts proposed here may not
have significant implications for an expertise-reliant and norms-abiding
president, but they could prove powerful—perhaps crucial—if a different
kind of person holds the office.
B. Institutional Paths to More Congressional Control
Congress’s power over international engagement is hobbled by the
legal views of the executive branch. Ultimate control now lies with the
executive branch, because of its legal positions and its ability to make
good on these positions in practice. Members of Congress interested in
changing this dynamic could pursue one or more of three institutional
strategies.
First, Congress and its members could emphasize countervailing views
of the diplomatic powers. Congress has already established a strong
position of non-acquiescence to the current positions of the executive
branch. As described in this Article, it has passed many statutes in the past
asserting control over aspects of the content, agents, and information
underlying U.S. international engagement. It has continued to pass such
statutes in recent years, notwithstanding an increasing barrage of
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disapproving letters from the Department of Justice and signing
statements from the President. These actions demonstrate Congress’s
institutional ability to resist executive branch claims to exclusive
powers—even despite all of Congress’s collective action problems and
the risks of a presidential veto.
In addition to continuing this approach, members of Congress should
also consider formalizing the legal reasoning that justifies these statutory
positions. Congress has no equivalent to OLC, but its committees can hold
hearings on the allocation of constitutional power or undertake
framework studies. In January 2001, for example, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee commissioned a major study of treaties from the
Congressional Research Service.162 This study has come to serve as a
reference point for members of Congress and for the scholarly
community. A similar study undertaken with respect to diplomacy and its
constitutional meaning could draw on long-neglected sources that bolster
congressional claims to control.
Second, Congress and its members could raise the cost for the
executive branch of its extreme legal positions on what it calls diplomacy.
Members of Congress have soft powers available for use in this regard.
Prospective OLC heads could be asked about these positions at their
Senate confirmation hearings. Congressional committees could hold
hearings on occasions where the executive branch squarely disregards a
statutory mandate related to U.S. international engagement.
The back-and-forth that can occur at the policy-formation stage
between committees and executive branch actors—particularly
agencies—already means that executive branch actors may be much more
accommodating to congressional views in practice than OLC thinks they
need to be as a matter of law. But Congress could further strengthen the
power of its statutory mandates by tying executive non-adherence to
meaningful consequences. Ordinarily, the executive branch treats these
mandates as severable, allowing it to get the benefits of authorizations for
appropriations while ignoring the limits tied to it. In a 1990 memorandum
deeming unconstitutional a provision that certain legislative-branchconnected officials be included in a particular set of negotiations, for
example, William Barr concluded that the provision was severable from
the overall authorization for funding in the absence of “evidence that
162
Cong. Rsch. Serv., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United
States Senate (Comm. Print 2001).
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Congress would not have enacted the authorization absent the
condition.”163 Congress could attach “anti-severability” provisions (also
known as “inseverability” provisions) to mandates that it thinks the
executive branch might resist—thus raising the stakes considerably for
such resistance.164 Alternatively, Congress could increase the extent to
which it ties rewards to obedience to congressional mandates, as it has
done in the past with respect to the negotiation of trade agreements that
will need ex post congressional approval.165
As a third set of institutional strategies, Congress or its members could
threaten to involve the courts. This strategy has both the highest risks and
rewards. The Zivotofsky case came to the Supreme Court because
Congress wrote a statute that carved a pathway to litigation, giving U.S.
citizens born in Jerusalem the statutory right to list “Israel” as their place
of birth on their passports.166 When one such citizen was denied this right,
he had standing to sue, and the Supreme Court held that the case did not
present a political question.167 When the case returned to the Supreme
Court on the merits, however, the Court issued a blow against
congressional power, as it validated the executive branch claims of
exclusive constitutional power over recognition.168
To the extent to which Congress wishes to tee up challenges for the
courts over control of U.S. international engagement with respect to
content, agents, and information, it has some capacity to do so. The path
to the courts runs most clear with respect to information. In the national
security context, the Trump administration failed to publish a statutorily
mandated report on uses of military force, leading several national
security experts and a nonprofit to sue for its disclosure.169 Similar
163

OLC Opinion of Feb. 16, 1990, supra note 40, at 45.
For a discussion of inseverability clauses as general tactics and an analysis of their likely
enforceability, see, e.g., Israel E. Friedman, Note, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 903, 903–09 (1997).
165
See Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114–26, § 103(b)(3), 129 Stat. 319, 335 (providing the President with a pathway to a quick
up-or-down vote on trade agreements submitted prior to a certain date and conditional on
certain involvement of members of Congress in the negotiating process and adherence to
certain substantive objectives).
166
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 7–9 (2015); Pub. L. 107–228, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350,
1366 (2002).
167
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 191 (2012).
168
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. at 32.
169
See Scott R. Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, We Filed Suit Over Trump’s Missing War
Powers Report, Lawfare (June 9, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-filed-suit-overtrumps-missing-war-powers-report [https://perma.cc/R5HA-KVF3] (embedding the
164
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lawsuits could be brought should the executive branch withhold
information related to international engagement that it is statutorily
mandated to make public. Members of Congress or a single House of
Congress might similarly be able to sue over information withheld from
Congress despite a statutory mandate to provide it or over information
subpoenaed by a congressional committee but then withheld.
With respect to control over content and agents, congressional
mandates that are disregarded by the executive branch could give rise to
lawsuits by injured private parties or—conditional on congressional
standing—by members of Congress. As to content, while many issues
might not be justiciable, actions with legal and practical significance like
votes in the World Bank could have consequences for private actors that
would generate standing to sue. As to agents, private actors harmed by
international agreements negotiated by non-Senate-confirmed officials or
by nondiplomats whom Congress had banned from the negotiations could
also give rise to lawsuits, just as a hedge fund recently (if unsuccessfully)
brought an Appointments Clause challenge to a congressionally
established board with power over aspects of Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy.170
Similarly, interested actors would also likely be able to sue over any
violations of notice-and-comment procedures that Congress has
established or comes to establish for agencies regarding international
negotiations.
To the extent that members of Congress wish to involve the courts as a
strategy, as distinct from writing statutes that happen to lead to standing
and causes of action for private actors, there are various ways to go about
it. Zivotofsky involved a matter of international engagement where the
executive branch had an unusually strong claim to exclusivity in light of
the absence of past statutes mandating recognition decisions and
considerable Supreme Court dicta about the executive exclusivity of the
recognition power. It also involved an issue that was both classically
diplomatic in nature (recognition) and as politically sensitive as it gets
(the status of Jerusalem). An alternative approach would be to focus
initially on the areas where Congress’s claims look the strongest as a
complaint). The executive branch ultimately released the report, thus ending the litigation.
Scott R. Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, Trump Administration Releases Overdue War Powers
Report in Response to Lawsuit, Lawfare (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
trump-administration-releases-overdue-war-powers-report-response-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/E2Z6-L3A6].
170
Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. For P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

142

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:81

matter of constitutional structure or historical practice. The activity of
administrative agencies abroad is one such area, given the substantial
arguments that these activities should not be thought of as “diplomacy”
for constitutional purposes. For instance, the Supreme Court might not be
too sympathetic to executive branch claims to exclusive diplomatic
powers where the underlying activities involve the Department of the
Treasury’s involvement in international standard-setting for insurance
regulation.171
The institutional path to more congressional control is not an easy one.
In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson made the chilling
observation that “[i]f not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the
maxim attributed to Napoleon that ‘the tools belong to the man who can
use them.’”172 While the Trump administration was even more extreme
than prior administrations in claiming broad exclusive diplomatic powers,
its words and actions have rested on a foundation contributed to by all
five administrations that immediately preceded it. If Congress continues
its current approach, it will maintain some degree of non-acquiescence to
these executive branch positions, but it will not have the ability to
mandate their implementation in practice. Only stronger steps, such as the
second and third strategies discussed here, will enable that to occur.
Congress’s potential success in gaining back control over content,
agents, and information in U.S. international engagement would have
further implications for practice and policy. Right now, the executive
branch can ignore statutory mandates with which it disagrees and that it
can classify as going to “diplomacy.” But if that changes, then we may
see more executive pushback against congressional mandates during the
lawmaking process. The executive branch is likely to be particularly
resistant to long-term mandates that leave it without substantive
flexibility. By contrast, provisions that allow for considerable executive
discretion, impose procedural requirements (e.g., notice requirements)
rather than substantive ones, or have sunset clauses are more likely to get
enacted. These in turn are the kind of provisions that enhance dialogue
between the branches.

171
Cf. DOJ Letter of Mar. 5, 2018, supra note 2, at 2 (asserting that exclusive executive
branch powers over diplomacy apply to this domain).
172
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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C. Broader Implications for Constitutional Law
Constitutional control over diplomacy is a neglected aspect of the
broader separation of powers. The account given in this Article is
therefore important not only for its treatment of this fascinating and
understudied issue but also for what it contributes to more general debates
in constitutional theory and practice.
One contribution of this Article relates to executive branch lawyering
and its effects. Do executive branch lawyers do more to constrain
presidential power or to enable it? Especially since the infamous torture
memos in George W. Bush’s first term, OLC has come under substantial
scholarly scrutiny.173 OLC has few full-throated proponents, but its partial
defenders emphasize the importance of its internal norms, “including a
strong norm of adhering to its own precedents even across
administrations.”174
This examination of the diplomatic powers has several implications for
the broader literature about OLC. First, it reinforces how one-sided OLC
can be in its legal analysis: cherry-picking the constitutional inputs that
support a position favorable to presidential power and then overreading
these inputs. Second, it demonstrates how transparency can be a tool of
power rather than constraint. The stream of OLC memoranda about
diplomatic content, agents, and information have not generated outrage
or meaningful pushback over the years—perhaps because it is hard to
mobilize public attention over a question like whether the head of the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy can or cannot
173
For a sampling of the extensive literature, see Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make,
103 Va. L. Rev. 805, 812 (2017) (arguing that “executive branch legalism has never been an
external, or exogenous, constraint on presidential power” but rather “always . . . a tool of
presidential administration itself”); Adoree Kim, Note, The Partiality Norm: Systematic
Deference in the Office of Legal Counsel, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 757, 760 (2018) (finding in an
empirical review that OLC is “deeply deferential to the President and to presidential action,
while remaining relatively impartial towards the agencies”); Sudha Setty, No More Secret
Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win,
57 Kan. L. Rev. 579 (2009) (arguing for increased disclosure of OLC opinions); Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688 (2011) (pointing to institutional
factors that promote self-restraint within OLC); Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the
American Republic 143–52 (2010) (arguing for the need of an independent quasi-judicial body
within the executive branch). For earlier scholarship on OLC, one interesting resource is a
symposium by the Cardozo Law Review entitled Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law.
See John O. McGinnis, Introduction, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 21 (1993) (introducing numerous
essays, several of which focus on OLC).
174
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and
Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, 1133 (2013).
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collaborate with Chinese counterparts. This build-up of low-stakes
precedents can provide valuable legitimacy for major moves down the
road.175 Third, this examination of the diplomatic powers shows how
OLC’s norm of adherence to precedent can itself be a source of concern.
OLC now justifies its positions on the diplomatic powers mostly by
citations to prior OLC opinions. Heavy reliance on its own precedents
makes it more difficult for OLC to change course and acknowledge that
sweeping claims of exclusive presidential powers stand on shallow
ground.
Another contribution made by this Article relates to historical practice.
This source of constitutional meaning is typically thought to favor the
President in separation-of-powers disputes. The President has the
incentive and the ability to exercise power, while the challenge of
collective action makes Congress more likely to acquiesce than to resist
(as does the fact that many members will be loyal to the President under
the party system).176 The recognition power addressed in Zivotofsky is an
example: in finding presidential power over recognition to be exclusive,
the Court emphasized that historical practice “strong[ly] support[ed]” this
conclusion and that the “weight of historical evidence indicate[d]”
congressional acquiescence.177
Yet for the other powers relating to international engagement, it is
notable how much historical practice exists that supports Congress. Why
is this the case? For the diplomatic powers, it is the executive branch
claiming exclusive power—unlike the power to initiate uses of force
abroad, where the question is whether Congress has exclusive power. This
makes Congress’s task easier. Because it is the executive branch claiming
exclusive powers over diplomacy (defined broadly), any congressional
175
On another important issue of foreign relations law—whether the President has the power
to unilaterally withdraw the United States from treaties entered with the advice and consent of
the Senate—Curtis Bradley shows how low-stakes precedents became crucial ammunition in
favor of presidential power during President Carter’s high-stakes decision to withdraw the
United States from its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty
Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 773, 775 (2014) (observing that “[p]ractice
then builds up around low-stakes examples” until “a more controversial example arises and
the President pushes forward successfully, thereby consolidating the changed
understanding”).
176
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 84, at 438–47; see also Shalev Roisman, Constitutional
Acquiescence, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668, 684–97 (2016) (noting the relevance of other
factors to acquiescence).
177
576 U.S. 1, 23, 28 (2015); see also Roisman, supra note 176, at 671 (using Zivotofsky as
an example).
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statute that sets forth mandates can be deemed practice that counts against
these proclaimed exclusive powers. A law stating “the policy of the
United States” or mandating the executive branch to supply information
to Congress is highly probative that Congress thinks it has the power to
establish foreign policy or require the disclosure of information. In
contrast, for the power to initiate uses of force abroad, Congress does not
get much mileage as a matter of historical practice out of statutes
authorizing the use of military force.
In other words, one lesson from this Article is that historical practice
tends to support findings of concurrent rather than exclusive powers. It is
relatively easy for a branch to express its view that it has a concurrent
power through practice—all it has to do is to exercise this power. By
contrast, it is harder for a branch to express its view that it has an exclusive
power through practice—it must not only exercise this power but also
resist exercises of this power by the other branch. Where Congress is
claiming a concurrent rather than exclusive power, as in the present
context, it benefits from this trend even as it suffers from the separate
ways in which historical practice tends to favor the President as the more
energetic branch.
One final contribution of this Article is to highlight the interface
between administrative law and foreign relations law. We are far from the
days in which there was a firm line between foreign affairs and domestic
ones, if indeed those days ever fully existed. Yet the executive branch
favors keeping all its proclaimed exclusive prerogatives even as oncedomestic issues spread into foreign spaces. Shirin Sinnar has written
about “rule of law tropes”—ways in which the executive branch uses
“recognizable term[s] from constitutional or international law” to
legitimate its actions in contexts very different from the ones in which
these terms are ordinarily used.178 The executive branch’s sweeping use
of “diplomacy” can similarly be said to be a trope that papers over the
vast differences between international negotiation at the time of the
Framing and international engagement today. As domestic agencies move
into foreign affairs—and as foreign affairs become more involved in the
regulation of individual conduct—we need doctrine that takes these shifts

178
Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1566, 1573
(2016).
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into account. Some scholarship engages with these issues, but there is a
long way to go.179
CONCLUSION: “THE ILL-FAVOURED NAME OF DIPLOMACY”
Our constitutional system suffers from the “ill-favoured name of
diplomacy.”180 As this Article has shown, the executive branch has
transformed what was at best a narrow set of presidential prerogatives
with respect to the conduct of treaty negotiations into sweeping
constitutional justifications for exclusive control over “diplomacy”—
understood very broadly. It has done so by overreading sources from the
Founding era, disregarding structural reasoning that favors congressional
control, and ignoring extensive historical practice in tension with its
positions.
It is time for a better structural allocation of power. The executive
branch should not have constitutional carte blanche to write off Congress
when it identifies policy objectives, oversees U.S. agencies as they engage
in overseas negotiations, or seeks the information it needs to decide
whether the President has committed an impeachable offense. Future
administrations will need to decide whether they wish to make
indefensibly broad claims of exclusive executive power or instead pivot
towards a more nuanced stance. If the executive branch does not cede
ground of its own accord, then Congress has tools at its disposal to bolster
its constitutional authority over international engagement.

179

For scholarship grappling with the interplay between administrative law and foreign
relations law, see, e.g., Elena Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 Geo. L.J. 1063,
1067 (2020) (arguing that administrative law practice is becoming embedded even in “the
foreign and security realm” through “individualized measures applied repeatedly and
indefinitely through bureaucratic mechanisms”); Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 142, at 742
(arguing that where administrative agencies make non-binding international commitments,
foreign relations law doctrines can be used “to put a thumb on the scale in favor of deferring
to the judgments of regulators that international cooperation, or the harmonization of our rules
and those in foreign countries, represents the best solution to cross-border regulatory
problems”); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649,
651–53 (2000) (arguing that Chevron has relevance for foreign affairs law); cf. Ganesh
Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev.
1897, 1901–02 (2015) (arguing generally that foreign relations law has “normalized” to
resemble domestic law and providing normative arguments for this development).
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Nicolson, supra note 113, at 12.

